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This investigation, which properly speaking should be called 
only a transcendental critique but not a doctrine, is all we are 
dealing with at present. It is not meant to expand our knowl-
edge but only to correct it, and to become the touchstone of 
the value, or lack of value, of all a priori knowledge. Such a 
critique is therefore the preparation, as far as possible, for a 
new organon, or, if this should turn out not to be possible, 
for a canon at least, according to which, thereafter, the com-
plete system of a philosophy of pure reason, whether it serve 
as an expansion or merely as a limitation of its knowledge, 
may be carried out both analytically and synthetically.
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I n T R o Du C T I o n
1
Eighteenth-century königsberg was a curious place for a philosopher to have 
spent his life. obviously, it was neither the city nor even the century in which the 
French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (the subject of this thesis) lived. Rather, it was 
home to Immanuel kant, the founder of transcendental philosophy and arguably 
the city’s most famous inhabitant. As the story goes, despite the immense fame he 
eventually garnered and the numerous invitations he received to lecture at pres-
tigious state academies across Prussia, kant never traveled more than a hundred 
miles from his hometown during his entire life—why?
Although it was geographically remote, being situated at the eastern corner 
of the Baltic, königsberg was far from a provincial town. During kant’s life it was the 
capital of East Prussia with its own university and representative national Assembly. 
It was also connected to the rest of the world through its access to the sea, favored 
by its location for maritime commerce.1 In that sense it was much closer to London, 
the capital of the British Empire, than Berlin. As a major commercial center, it 
was also a place where different languages and customs intersected: the cosmopoli-
1 Allen W. Wood, “kant’s Life and Works,” A Companion to Kant, ed. graham Bird (Malden: Black-
well Publishing, 2006), p. 11.
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tan milieu of königsberg meant that one could expand one’s knowledge and learn 
about the world even without travel.2
kant first encountered the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff while attending 
the university of königsberg. Leibnizian/Wolffian rationalism, which espoused the 
primacy of the intellectual faculty over the senses, held undisputed sway in Prussia 
at the time. Yet königsberg, being in uniquely close proximity to Britain through 
the north Atlantic trade routes, also fell under the purview of David Hume’s em-
piricist philosophy, which held that rational knowledge, in fact, was only an abstrac-
tion from a more fundamental sensory experience. Following the dominant line of 
Leibniz/Wolff, the only other choice was to accept Hume’s empiricist skepticism, 
neither of which kant was satisfied with. So he confined himself to a decade of si-
lence—and it was out of this silence that transcendental criticism emerged. Reflecting 
back on this period in Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics [1783], kant wrote:
I openly confess [that] the suggestion of David Hume was the very 
thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, 
and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite 
a new direction.3
After awakening from his “dogmatic slumber,” kant could no longer simply accept 
either the empiricist critique of rationalism or the rationalist critique of empiricism. 
For him, these were not simply two competing schools of thought. Rather, in kant's 
philosophy they came to stand for two radically split faculties—understanding and 
sensibility—which condition our experience of the world. It was therefore not 
enough to see things from one’s own viewpoint (rationalism) or from the viewpoint 
of another (empiricism). Instead one had to face the reality that is exposed through 
2 kojin karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx (London: The MIT Press, 2005), p. 135.
3 Immanuel kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics [1783], trans. Paul Carus (Chicago: open 
Court Publishing, 1912), p. 7.
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difference.4 Thus in his Critique of Pure Reason [1781/1871], published after his emer-
gence from a decade of silence, kant sought to establish, on the basis of this differ-
ence, the limits of reason by means of reason’s own self-scrutiny: in other words, it 
was a critique of reason by reason—or a transcendental critique (transcritique).5
So what does kant, a sober Enlightenment thinker, have to do with Jacques 
Lacan, a wild French theorist? In his formidable Transcritique, Japanese philosopher 
and literary critic kojin karatani performs a “symptomatic” reading of kant in or-
der to unearth the obscured transcritical dimension of his texts, offering a radical 
interpretation of kant’s entire philosophical corpus. using the resulting framework 
provided by karatani, I have attempted to turn the kantian “gaze” back upon Lacan. 
My contention is that Lacanian psychoanalysis is not a doctrine or a system, but a 
rigorous critique in the kantian sense. Similar to kant’s self-imposed exile, each 
break in Lacan’s work (understanding) corresponds to a moment of institutional 
crisis within the French psychoanalytic community (sensibility). And by way of this 
incessant transposition (crisis), Lacan encountered numerous oppositions in vari-
ous topos (Melanie klein vs. Anna Freud, structuralism vs. post-structuralism) that 
could not simply be ignored or synthesized: instead, like kant, one could only assert 
the irreducible difference inherent to each opposition (parallax). It was through 
these transcritical encounters, I argue, that Lacanian psychoanalysis was born.
To begin, Part I asks the question: “How did Freud enter France?” In 
other words, what were the (historical) preconditions upon which Lacanian psycho-
analysis was founded? Following Elisabeth Roudinesco I argue that, at least prior to 
4 karatani, Transcritique, p. 3.
5 Ibid., p. 47.
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1926, there was no monolithic channel or nexus through which Freud came to be 
received. Rather, the French reception of psychoanalysis was from the very begin-
ning marred by fission, splits, and contradiction—particularly between the medi-
cal and intellectual channels. Thus, as both a psychiatrist and a “fellow traveler” 
amongst the Surrealists, Lacan’s heterodox reading of Freud came to be mediated 
by a wide variety of unlikely sources, including Clérambault’s dynamic psychology, 
Dalí’s paranoia-criticism, and kojève’s reading of Hegel. More precisely, out of the 
chance encounter between orthodox Freudianism and german phenomenology, 
Lacan came to formulate what has become his most widely recognized (though 
mostly overemphasized) contribution to the psychoanalytic field, namely “the mir-
ror stage” theory. Yet, as I argue in the conclusion to Part I, the Imaginary functions 
of identification and misrecognition elaborated in the mirror stage presuppose the 
Symbolic fields of speech and language—a fact that is evident in Lacan’s writing at 
the time, but which is often overlooked.
Part II begins by demonstrating that Freud’s and Lacan’s respective corpuses 
have often been misinterpreted and misrepresented as coherent systems. Instead, 
I argue, Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is marked by incessant breaks, or more 
precisely what Louis Althusser called “epistemological breaks”: an unconscious shift 
from one “problematic” to an entirely different theoretical framework (in kantian 
terms, a rupture in the faculty of understanding). Thus in 1953 Lacan broke with 
his earlier work, which focused on the phenomenology of ego-formation (i.e., the 
mirror stage), by way of an elaboration of his structuralist theory of the uncon-
scious. Regarding this, Slavoj Žižek writes:
Lacan started his “return to Freud” with the linguistic reading of the 
entire psychoanalytic edifice, encapsulated by what is perhaps his 
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single best known formula: “the unconscious is structured as a lan-
guage.” The predominant perception of the unconscious is that it is 
the domain of irrational drives, something opposed to the rational 
conscious self. For Lacan, this notion of the unconscious belongs to 
the Romantic Lebensphilosophie and has nothing to do with Freud. The 
Freudian unconscious caused such a scandal not because of the claim 
that the rational self is subordinated to the much vaster domain of 
blind irrational instincts, but because it demonstrated how the uncon-
scious itself obeys its own grammar and logic – the unconscious talks 
and thinks. The unconscious is not the reservoir of wild drives that 
has to be conquered by the ego, but the site where a traumatic truth 
speaks.6
But why did Lacan suddenly initiate a “return to Freud” in 1953? In other words, 
what prompted the “epistemological break” with his previous phenomenological 
framework? My argument is that such breaks in the understanding are inevitably ac-
companied by what karatani refers to as “transposition,” a simultaneous rupture in 
the faculty of sensibility—understood concretely, for example, as geographic migra-
tion, dislocation, exile, self-imposed isolation, etc. Lacan’s structuralist turn could 
not, therefore, have occurred without the accompanying crisis in the Société Psych-
analytique de Paris that same year, as a result of which Lacan lost his membership in 
the International Psychoanalytical Association (I PA ).
By way of transposition, Lacan came to encounter the opposing analytic 
techniques of Melanie klein and Anna Freud, whose bitter feuds during the late-
1940s had left a lasting mark upon the international psychoanalytic community. But 
rather than treating their techniques as two opposing schools of thought, as did the 
I PA , Lacan—in a similar way to kant—concluded that they in fact stood for the two 
dominant tendencies inherent to the structure of transference itself. Through this 
transcendental turn, Lacan came to extract the triadic topology of the Real, Sym-
6 Slavoj Žižek, How to Read Lacan (new York: W. W. norton, 2007), pp. 1-2.
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bolic, and Imaginary—the famous “Borromean knot.”
Part III, the final chapter, focuses on the accompanying shift in Lacan’s 
thought apropos subjectivity following his “excommunication” from the I PA  in 
1963. Prior to this second transposition, Lacan had conceived the subject as entirely 
“subjected” to the totality of the structure. This is evident in his reading of Edgar 
Allen Poe’s short detective story “The Purloined Letter,” in which Lacan interprets 
the letter as a signifier without a signified that determines the various positions of 
the subjects within the signifying chain. After 1963, however, Lacan broke with his 
earlier formulation of the subject as totally alienated by the signifer: in the “pro-
nounced parallax” between structuralism and post-structuralism, Lacan came to 
reject the structural determinism of the former, while simultaneously he affirmed 
it against the latter. He thereby initiated a “return to Descartes,” arguing that the 
subject of the unconscious is none other than the Cartesian cogito—the void that 
exists in between structures, in the transcendental topos. To conclude Part III, then, I 
examine a concrete instance of the “cogito as void” in the transition from modernity 
to postmodernity in the city of Baltimore, chosen due to its unique status as the loca-
tion of the birth of post-structuralism during the 1966 Johns Hopkins Humanities 
Center symposium.
In crafting this thesis, each of the three chapters was designed to corre-
spond to one of the three interlocking rings of the Lacanian Borromean knot. Thus 
Part I focuses on Lacan’s explication of the Imaginary order through his theory of 
the mirror stage and, accordingly, the function of misrecognition inherent to the 
ego (kantian transcendental illusion); Part II begins with Lacan’s structuralist/lin-
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guistic turn towards an elaboration of the Symbolic order through his encounter with 
the works of Lévi-Strauss, Ferdinand de Saussure, and Roman Jakobson (kantian 
form); and Part III examines the role of transcendental subjectivity in Lacan’s work 
and its relationship to the Real (kantian thing-in-itself). Ands in Lacan’s topology, if 
any of the corresponding (and overlapping) rings are removed, the entire structure 
disintegrates.
T H E  B O R R O M E A N  K N O T
Finally, I consider this thesis to be neither purely historical nor purely theo-
retical. Rather, each of the subsections was written to reflect the oscillation between 
history and theory, or, in kantian terms, between pure and empirical knowledge: in 
other words, it is a “theory of the history of theoretical formations.”7 My goal in do-
ing this was to self-reflexively situate the production of this thesis—which happened 
to take place in the corresponding oscillation between the History and german 
departments—within the transcritical space. To the degree that I have succeeded 
(or failed) at this task should be judged, of course, not on the basis of what I have to 
say on the matter in this introduction, but rather on the merits of the contribution 
itself.




A  S P L I T  R E C E P T I o n
In the early history of psychoanalysis, France was something of a geographic 
lacuna: unlike most other countries, it had proven uniquely inhospitable to Freud’s 
theories—a fact that even Freud himself seems to have been aware of. on June 14, 
1907, in a letter addressed to Carl Jung, Freud wrote of their “difficulties with the 
French,” noting that they were “probably due chiefly to the national character; it 
has always been hard to import things into France.”1 In 1914 he concluded that “[a]
mong European countries France has hitherto shown itself the least disposed to 
welcome psychoanalysis.”
In Paris itself, a conviction still seems to reign (to which Janet himself 
gave eloquent expression at the Congress in London in 1913) that 
everything good in psychoanalysis is a repetition of Janet’s views with 
insignificant modifications and that everything else in it is bad.2
Pierre Janet, who was a pioneer in the field of psychiatry and one of Freud’s chief ri-
vals, gave voice to a number of the criticisms that fostered French resistance to Freud. 
1 Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, The Freud/Jung Letters, trans. R. F. C. Hull and Ralph Manheim 
(Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1944), p. 24.
2 Freud, On the History of the Psycho-analytic Movement, trans. Joan Riviere (new York: W. W. norton, 
1966), p. 36.
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At the 1913 International Conference on Medicine, for example, Janet claimed that 
the origins of psychoanalysis were to be found in the work of Jean-Martin Charcot—
under whom both he and Freud had studied—and that Freud’s contributions to the 
field were either meaningless, arbitrary, or both. Accordingly, Janet concluded that 
“psychoanalysis” was simply another term for his “psychological analysis.”3
others found Freud’s views even more objectionable than did Janet.4 Freud 
recounts in his Autobiographical Study that a “number of papers and newspaper ar-
ticles… from France… gave a violent objection to the acceptance of psychoanalysis,” 
an objection that made the “most inaccurate assertions” regarding his relationship 
to the “French school.”5 In the same memoir, Freud recalls the utterances of an un-
named professor of psychology at the Sorbonne who went so far as to declare that 
psychoanalysis—at least of the Freudian kind—was “inconsistent with the génie latin.”6 
These remarks, however, appear less surprising when situated within the context of 
pervasive anti-german sentiment and reactionary nationalism, which colored the 
milieu of the Belle Époque and early interwar years in France (and anti-semitism, to 
be sure, was always just beneath the surface). During this period, psychoanalysis and 
phenomenology came to be seen as Teutonic inventions aimed primarily at cultural 
domination. one article in the French newspaper La Patrie, for example, referred to 
psychoanalysis “infiltrating” France and spreading “obscenity and demoralization,”7 
3 Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry 
(new York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 817-818.
4 It is worth noting that Janet, in fact, had defended Freud against unwarranted criticism during a 
meeting of the Paris Psychotherapy Society in June 1914. Cf. Ellenberger, p. 821.
5 Freud, An Autobiographical Study, trans. James Strachey (new York: W. W. norton, 1989), p. 11.
6 Ibid., p. 70.
7 Elisabeth Roudinesco, La Bataille de cent ans. Histoire de la psychoanalyse en France, vol. 1: 1885-1939 
(Paris: Ramsay, 1982), pp. 283-284.
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while a 1928 article in the conservative Le Temps cited the Minister of Education, for 
whom the distinction between germany and Austria was of little importance, as hav-
ing said: “I am assured that german youth is being poisoned by Freud. Freudianism 
is a northern phenomenon. It cannot succeed in France. Beyond the Rhine, Freud-
ianism will complete the work of dissolution begun by the war.”8
The few sympathizers Freud had found in the French psychiatric community 
were not anymore encouraging, expressing a similar desire to defend the national 
genius of France against the “invasion” of germanic Kultur, even if such a desire was 
articulated in more moderate terms. In his 1922 preface to the second edition of 
La Psychoanalyse des névroses et des psychoses, co-written with Emmanuel Régis, Angélo 
Hesnard wrote:
And the doctrine of Freud, which springs, not as it has sometimes 
been said from the French genius of Charcot, but rather from ger-
manic philosophy, could not meet a more useful ally in its search for 
the truth than the sense of moderation which is the inspiration be-
hind the French genius.9
For Hesnard and Régis, as well as others, “moderation” seems to have meant de-
emphasizing or ignoring wholesale certain aspects of Freud’s thought that were 
inexplicably seen as being too “germanic,” that is, as either “pansexual” (the libido 
theory) or characterized by an irrepressible penchant for system-building. Com-
ing to Freud’s defense against charges of pansexualism, René Allendy, who along 
with Hesnard would become one of the founding members of the Société Psych-
analytique de Paris (S P P ), argued that “libido” was nothing more than a variant of 
8 Ibid., p. 284.
9 Angélo Hesnard and Emmanuel Régis, La Psychoanalyse des névroses et des psychoses (Paris: Felix 
Alcan, 1914), preface to the second edition.
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Henri Bergson’s élan vital—the vital force.10 It was clear, then, that even those who 
might have considered themselves sympathetic to Freud’s views chose to reconcile 
his theories with more well-known French analogues in order to conform to pre-
vailing ideological norms and, in particular, the chauvinist medical establishment. 
So while the position of Freud’s allies, articulated most clearly in the statement of 
principle published in the first issue (April 1925) of Evolution Psychiatrique, aimed at 
centralizing the information on research carried out in France that used Freudian 
methods, they also sought to adapt psychoanalytic theory “as well as possible to the 
spirit of [their] race.”11
If the medical field in France diluted Freud’s theories by identifying them 
with Janet’s psychology and Bergson’s philosophy—making it difficult, at times, to 
distinguish the claims of Freud’s proponents from those of his detractors—the in-
tellectual field, composed of artists, writers, and so on, brought a very different 
view of Freudianism to the Parisian scene.12 The Surrealists, such as André Breton, 
Salvador Dalí, and René Crevel, saw the unconscious as a genuinely new modal-
ity for expressing creative thought, one that could be used to subvert the codified 
social norms. Breton expressed this view quite elegantly, and in all of its bourgeois 
charm, when he described hysteria as “the greatest poetic discovery of the latter part 
of the [nineteenth] century,” adding that it “may be considered in every respect a 
10 David Macey, Lacan in Contexts (London: Verso, 1988), p. 28.
11 “Avant Propos,” Evolution Psychiatrique, 1, no. 1 (1925).
12 Although Freud had initially come to the conclusion that his ideas had been largely rejected in 
France, in a footnote added to On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement in 1923 he remarked 
that his translated works had now aroused keen interest, “even in France,” but adds that “this is 
more active in literary circles than in scientific ones,” Freud, On the History of the Psycho-Analytic 
Movement, p. 37.
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supreme means of expression.”13 Rather than seeing the neuroses as pathological 
conditions in need of treatment—as was the predominant view within the medical 
field—the Surrealists celebrated hysteria for shattering the psychic bond that linked 
the individual with external reality. Consequently, the Surrealists sought to establish 
a radical break between psychoanalysis, particularly the “lay” character of Freudian 
doctrine to which they adhered, and the ideals of the French medical community, 
which they regarded with suspicion as a reactionary ideology that was fundamen-
tally at odds with their revolutionary aspirations.
There thus emerged two coexisting but contradictory modes in which Freud 
had entered into French thought. on the one hand, there was the medical channel, 
represented by the Evolution Psychiatrique group, which included Hesnard, Régis, 
Allendy, and Edouard Pichon, and then, in 1926, the orthodox Freudians, who co-
alesced around the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, the first Freudian psychoana-
lytic group in France to be sanctioned by the International Psychoanalytical Associa-
tion (I PA ).14 on the other hand, there was the intellectual channel, which included 
the Surrealists, political radicals, and other members of the French intelligentsia. 
While the former (at least those in the Evolution Psychiatrique group) were less in-
terested in a genuine theory of the unconscious, preferring instead the established 
norms of the medical field, the latter posed itself in direct opposition, postulating 
a radical discontinuity between two integrated elements—the biological and the 
cultural—in Freud’s thought.15
13 André Breton, Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 1 (Paris: gallimard, “La Pléiade,” 1988), p. 949.
14 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan & Co.: A History of Psychoanalysis in France, 1925-1985, trans. Jeffrey 
Mehlman (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 116.
15 Ibid., pp. 8-10.
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L AC A n
Jacques-Marie-Émile Lacan, born on April 13, 1901 in Paris to a Catholic fam-
ily of vinegar merchants, was one of few doctors of the time—perhaps even the only 
one—who oscillated between the divided medical and intellectual fields. Although 
a number of the Surrealists, such as Louis Aragon, André Breton, Théodore Fraen-
kel, and Philippe Soupault, had undertaken medical studies, their entrance into in-
tellectual life meant abandoning their medical careers.16 Lacan, on the other hand, 
began to work out of a unique space between the two fields while still maintaining 
his ties to the medical establishment, which he joined in 1926 after specializing in 
psychiatry at the Hôpital Sainte-Anne in Paris. This happened to be the same year 
that the Société Psychanalytique de Paris was founded, although it would take Lacan 
another eight years to become a member. But while at the Hôpital Sainte-Anne, he 
became fascinated by cases involving paranoia. Influenced by the work of gaëtan 
gatian de Clérambault, Lacan published an important theoretical text in 1931, ti-
tled “Structures of Paranoid Psychoses,” in which he made use of Clérambault’s 
“dynamic” view of psychosis based on the study of underlying psychodynamic pro-
cesses (a position that happened to be much closer to Freud’s), as opposed to the 
prevailing “constitutional” view based on organicism, heredity, and degeneration.17
Although Lacan had adopted much of the conventional terminology used by 
the medical field, one of the major inspirations for his 1932 doctoral thesis, titled 
“Paranoid Psychosis and Its Relation to Personality,” had been an article written by 
16 Ibid., p. 5.
17 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, trans. Barbara Bray (new York: Columbia university Press, 1997), pp. 
23-24.
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Salvador Dalí featured in the July 1930 issue of Surréalisme au Service de la Révolution. 
The paper, titled “L’Ane pourri,” focused primarily on Dalí’s notion of “paranoia-
criticism,” which saw paranoia as much as an interpretation of reality as a creative 
activity rooted in the mind’s logic. Combining Dalí’s surrealist vision with Cléram-
bault’s dynamic psychiatry, Lacan broke with the theory of constitutionalism by for-
mulating a dynamic theory of self-punishment paranoia.18 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
then, Lacan’s thesis received a fair share of praise from a number of prominent 
figures in the Surrealist movement, as well as the French intelligentsia (although it 
was almost completely ignored by the first generation of French psychoanalysts who 
belonged to the Société Psychanalytique de Paris, as well as the medical establish-
ment). In the February 1933 issue of L’Humanité, for example, Marxist philosopher 
Paul nizan hailed the thesis for reflecting the “definite and conscious influence of 
dialectical materialism,”19 and in May of that year, René Crevel praised Lacan for 
having made it possible to link together Marxism and psychoanalysis.20 Thus, de-
spite his close connections to the world of psychiatry, Lacan had become something 
of a heroic figure amongst the Surrealists. As Dalí himself had put it, “Because of 
[Lacan’s thesis] we can for the first time arrive at a complete and homogenous idea 
of the subject, quite free of the mechanistic mire in which present-day psychiatry is 
stuck.”21
However, Lacan’s oscillation between the medical and intellectual fields 
amounted to little more than a “synthesis” of the various ideas he had encountered 
18 Ibid., p. 31.
19 Paul nizan, L’Humanité, February 10, 1933.
20 René Crevel, Le Clavecin de Diderot (Paris: Pauvert, 1966), pp. 163-164.
21 Salvador Dalí, Le Minotaure, vol. 1 (Paris: Skira, 1933).
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and in that sense amounts to what I am calling his “pre-critical” period. Yet, perhaps 
by dint of this very oscillation, he opted against both fields in favor of what was 
perhaps both their greatest point of commonality and their greatest point of differ-
ence: Freud. So, in 1934, Lacan enlisted as a training analyst candidate in the S P P .
Although he had encountered Freud’s work as early as 1923,22 it was not 
until his time spent at Hôpital Sainte-Anne, particularly during the years in which 
he came under the influence of the Surrealist movement, that Lacan made any seri-
ous use of Freud’s theories. In 1932, he had translated an article by Freud entitled 
“Some neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia, and Homosexuality” for the Re-
vue Française de Psychanalyse.23 This was also the year that Lacan entered into analysis 
with Rudolph Loewenstein, who, along with Marie Bonaparte and Raymond de Sau-
ssure, was one of the original founders of the S P P , under which the Revue was an of-
ficial organ. not surprisingly, both Lacan’s translation and his doctoral thesis made 
use of Freudian terminology that conformed to the prevailing orthodoxy propagat-
ed by the I PA , to which both Loewenstein and Bonaparte, as members of the S P P , 
owed their allegiance.24 Picking up on the “adaptational” current in psychoanalysis 
(the notion that the agency of the ego functions as the representative of “reality” in 
the psyche) that was being espoused by Loewenstein and which foreshadowed Anna 
Freud’s ego psychology, Lacan argued that “[t]he therapeutic problem regarding 
psychosis seems to me to make a psychoanalysis of the ego more necessary than a 
22 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 13.
23 Lacan, “De quelques mécanismes névrotiques dans la jalousie, le paranoia et l’homosexualité,” 
RFP 5 (1932): pp. 391-401.
24 As Roudinesco points out, Lacan translated Trieb as “instinct,” Trauer as “sorrow,” and Regung as 
“tendency.” See Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 32.
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psychology of the unconscious…”25
P H E n o M E n o L o g Y  A n D  T H E  M I R R o R  S TAg E
At the same time as Lacan was becoming increasingly engaged with the or-
thodox Freudian establishment in France, a new intellectual current was sweeping 
across Paris. From 1933 to 1939, Alexandre kojève delivered spellbinding lectures 
on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit that much of the French intelligentsia, including 
Jacques Lacan, Raymond Queneau, georges Bataille, André Breton, and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, enthusiastically attended. kojève’s highly idiosyncratic reading of 
Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, which focused on the relationship between self-con-
sciousness and desire, drew heavily upon the wider intellectual and philosophical 
developments that were just beginning to reach France. These included györgy 
Lukács’s attempt to reunite Marx and Hegel in History and Class Consciousness, as 
well as Alexandre koyré’s lectures on Husserl and the philosophy of science. But 
perhaps the most influential philosophical work at the time was Martin Heidegger’s 
seminal text Being and Time, which marked a departure from the predominant ori-
entation of phenomenology within continental philosophy, calling instead for a re-
turn to ontology through his reading of pre-Socratic thought.
These developments would have been unimaginable to the generation of 
French people who lived prior to the interwar years, when germanophobia and 
French nationalism was pervasive. Freudian psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and 
Hegelian philosophy had all come to be most forcefully associated with the no-
tion of “pan-germanism” in the wake of the 1870 Franco-Prussian war and the First 
25 Lacan, De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personalité (Paris: Seuil, 1975), p.280.
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World War, both of which did little to assuage nationalistic tensions between the 
two countries. But now, ironically, such potently “Teutonic” thought had suddenly 
become the most widely flourishing intellectual orientation, if not in France as a 
whole, then at the very least amongst the Parisian avant-garde.
The renewed French intellectual fascination with german thought, and in 
particular Hegel and Hegelian dialectics, made an especially important impact on 
the field of psychology. one psychologist in particular who helped carry out this 
intellectual turn was Henri Wallon, a French psychologist and Marxist familiar with 
the works of Freud and Hegel. His dialectical theory of psychical development con-
tended that the human mind only comes into being as such through a series of 
stages, each of which is subject to periods of crisis and discontinuity. Wallon’s theory 
proved to be a tremendous influence on Lacan’s early phenomenological model 
of ego-formation, which drew as much on the orthodox reading of Freud that had 
been transmitted to him through the S P P  as it did on kojève’s reading of Hegel.26 
Lacan’s concept of the “mirror stage,” first elaborated around the mid-1930s using 
a term he had borrowed from Wallon, describes the genesis of self-consciousness 
in the mental development of the child via the process of narcissistic identification 
with its bodily image. This specular double, the inchoate ego, supplies an Imaginary 
“wholeness,” a misrepresentation of unity, to the child’s experience of fragmentary 
reality, insofar as the child’s lack of bodily coordination is perceived by the child as 
a fragmentation or disjointedness.
By 1936 Lacan had drafted an early version of the essay on the mirror stage 
26 Lacan and kojève had made plans to compile a comparative interpretation of Hegel and Freud 
that was to focus on the “genesis of self-consciousness,” the “origin of madness,” and “the essence 
of the family,” yet it never panned out. However, these three concepts went on to become recur-
ring themes throughout Lacan’s early work. Cf. Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, pp. 104-105.
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theory that he was scheduled to deliver at the first I PA  Congress in which he was to 
be in attendance. Held that same year, the congress convened on July 31 in Marien-
bad, Czechoslovakia. The location of the fourteenth I PA  congress was chosen for its 
geographic proximity to Vienna, where Freud was sequestered as a result of his rap-
idly declining health. The congress was held at a time when Freud’s theoretical revi-
sions, which included the introduction of the second topography (ego, superego, 
and id), were stirring controversy within the psychoanalytic movement, particularly 
between his daughter, Anna Freud, and Melanie klein, one of the leading figures of 
the British Psychoanalytical Society (B P S ). Lacan, however, was largely unaware of 
the schism developing on the “international stage,” so to speak, of psychoanalysis at 
the time. His focus was still limited to the intellectual developments in Paris, where 
the Freudian psychoanalytic community had formed a decade later than elsewhere.
C R I T I Q u E  o F  A S S o C I AT I o n I S M
on August 3 of that year Lacan rose to deliver his speech, but ten minutes 
later Ernest Jones, the president of the I PA  and one of Freud’s most loyal acolytes 
and (later) official biographer, interrupted Lacan, preventing the full speech from 
being delivered.27 But despite the personal setback for Lacan at Marienbad, the 
principle outcome of the trip, a short article titled “Beyond the ‘Reality Principle’,” 
proved to be an intellectually important one, marking the beginning of the early 
period of Lacan’s work. In addition to providing a clue to his later theoretical tra-
jectory, with regard to Lacan’s focus on language, the article reflects a cross-section 
of his early influences. These include his clinical work at Hôpital Sainte-Anne, the 
27 Ibid., p. 113.
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importance placed on free association by the Surrealists and their suspicion of the 
psychological notion of “reality,” as well as the need for developing a scientific the-
ory of ego-formation.
The focus of this short piece, according to Lacan, is to determine the core 
of what distinguishes Freud’s meta-psychology from the psychology that preceded 
it. He points first of all to the need for a “critique of associationism,”28 referring 
to one of the main principles of Hume’s empirical psychology which Freud had a 
tendency to make use of when referring to the mnemic system’s formation of “as-
sociative links,” which carry out, for example, unconscious displacement.29 Accord-
ing to Lacan, these associative links—mental phenomena based on the “experience 
of the living being’s reactions”—smuggle in the metaphysical notion of “similarity” 
as pregiven through a conceptual sleight of hand.30 Furthermore, in associationism 
psychical phenomena are categorized by intentionality, reducing all phenomena 
outside the operations of “rational knowledge”—including the psychical image—
to epiphenomena. Against the associative reduction, Lacan contends that Freud’s 
“revolutionary method” consisted in assigning meaning to seemingly meaningless 
phenomena, such as dreams, slips of the tongue, and bungled actions, in contrast 
with the “reality principle” which posits that the ego is capable of selectively assign-
ing meaning to psychical phenomena by determining which of these phenomena is 
28 Lacan, “Beyond the ‘Reality Principle’” [1936], in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (new York: W. W. nor-
ton, 2007), p. 59.
29 References to associationism and “associative links” can be found throughout Freud’s work. Cf. 
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, trans. James Strachey (new York: W. W. norton, 1971), p. 45: 
Freud writes that childhood memories “owe their retention in the mind not to their own content 
but to its associative connection with another, repressed subject, they have a good claim to be de-
scribed, in the term I have adopted for them, as ‘screen memories’” [my emphasis].
30 Lacan, “Beyond the ‘Reality Principle’,” in Écrits, p. 60.
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closer to “reality.”31
Following his critique of associationism and the reality principle, Lacan con-
cludes with a “phenomenological description of psychoanalytic experience,”32 in 
which he points to the unique role of language in transference:
…[L]anguage, prior to signifying something, signifies to someone. 
It is simply because the analyst is there listening that the man who 
speaks addresses him, and since he forces his discourse not to want 
to say anything, he becomes what this man wants to tell him. What 
the man says may, in fact, “have no meaning,” but what he says to the 
analyst conceals one anyway.33
For the Lacan of “Beyond the ‘Reality Principle’,” analysis can only take place if, first 
and foremost, there is an analyst who is situated as the analysand’s interlocutor and 
that, as a result of the transferential bond that is formed between the analyst and 
the analysand, the analysand’s discourse conceals an unconscious meaning that is 
drawn out through free association during analysis. According to Lacan, this is be-
cause “in [the analysand’s] very reaction to the listener’s refusal [to assume the role 
of interlocutor], the subject reveals the image he has replaced him with.”34 These 
images, formed through the process of identification, compose the “imaginary” or-
der of the psyche which, like the ego for Lacan, undergo a process of formation 
and development, rather than being pregiven. Consequently, the goal of Lacan’s 
early work—conceived as a meta-psychology and heavily influenced by phenom-
enology—was to understand how both the ego and external reality, as constituted 
by images, are formed.
31 Ibid., p. 65.
32 Ibid., p. 66.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 67.
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The French reception of Freudian psychoanalysis was a peculiar one: 
not, of course, to be attributed to any ridiculous conception of “French exception-
alism,” but rather due to the unlikely constellation of historical, political, and ideo-
logical factors which conditioned Freud’s French reception. In particular, the split 
in the channels by means of which psychoanalysis entered France played a decisive 
role: on the one hand, there was the medical community, which haphazardly co-
opted Freudian terminology and integrated it into a quite conservative and chau-
vinistic establishment. on the other hand, there was the intellectual community, 
composed of Surrealists, writers, and the emerging Parisian avant-garde as a whole, 
which sought to use Freudian psychoanalysis as a means of criticizing bourgeois so-
ciety and furthering their revolutionary goals. It was within this milieu that Lacan, 
as both a psychiatrist and a prominent “fellow traveler” amongst the Surrealists, first 
encountered Freud.
Another unique circumstance surrounding the initial French resistance 
to psychoanalysis was that the emergence of “legitimate” Freudianism took place 
there (in the form of the S P P —the first I PA -sanctioned psychoanalytic association 
in France—founded in 1926) nearly a decade later than elsewhere. Because of this 
temporal gap, the orthodox establishment of psychoanalysis came to emerge con-
currently with the introduction of german phenomenology into France, which be-
came exceedingly popular amongst French intellectuals, many of whom, including 
Lacan himself, packed the lecture halls of the École Pratique des Hautes Études to 
listen to kojève and koyré speak about the philosophies of Hegel, Husserl, and Hei-
degger—an otherwise unimaginable development given the pervasive germano-
phobia in France during the interwar years.
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All of these various avenues—psychiatry, orthodox Freudianism, Surrealism, 
Hegelianism, and phenomenology—came to play a crucial role in the early devel-
opment of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Their influence can be seen in Lacan’s for-
mulation of the mirror stage theory, which presents a phenomenological model of 
ego-formation and the genesis of self-consciousness through the interplay between 
alienation and identification, as well as in his critique of associationism and Freud’s 
“reality principle,” both of which represent Lacan’s attempts at distancing Freudian 
theory from its narrow-minded predecessor, empirical psychology. Furthermore, 
these two theoretical tendencies in Lacan’s early work—between ego-formation and 
language—ought to be understood, not as distinct realms, but rather as inherently 
intertwined. As Fredric Jameson notes, “[T]o speak of the Imaginary independently 
of the Symbolic is to perpetuate the illusion that we could have a relatively pure 
experience of either.”35 In order for identification to function, language—recogni-
tion—must already be operative at some level, and yet without an ego, a sense of 
Imaginary “wholeness,” one cannot designate oneself as “I,” making speech as such 
impossible.
Although Lacan had provided a fairly complete account of his theory of the 
mirror stage by 1949, his thoughts on language amounted to little more than a pro-
legomena in desperate need of elaboration, especially given the importance Freud 
himself had placed on the intersubjective and phylogenetic dimensions of the un-
conscious. Yet this step—the step towards an elaboration of a theory of the Symbolic 
order of speech and language—would have been impossible for Lacan had it not 
been for the development of structuralism.
35 Fredric Jameson, “Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the 




C o n T R oV E R S I A L  D I S C u S S I o n S
one of the peculiar features of Freud (and, for that matter, Lacan) was that 
he never stopped revising his theories. This is because Freudian theory operated 
primarily as a critique of previously existing thought—indeed, much of the content 
of Freud’s work is dedicated to criticizing the opinions of his contemporaries.1 This 
meant that, at least during his lifetime, Freud was able situate his work within a cer-
tain critical space in which the theoretical framework was constantly shifting in order 
to remain within the locus of criticism—often to the displeasure of his colleagues. 
Thus when Freud died on September 23, 1939 he left behind a huge corpus that, 
due to the constant revision of his theories, appeared inconsistent, even contradic-
tory, when viewed as a coherent doctrine. This led to two interconnected dilemmas: 
on the one hand, a centralized bureaucracy in the form of the I PA  was charged with 
overseeing the impossible task of translating Freud’s work into a consistent body of 
knowledge called “Freudianism.” on the other hand, these attempts led to irresolv-
able antinomies that divided his followers and pitted them against each other in a 
1 one could say the same of kant’s critique of metaphysics and Marx’s critique of the political 
economy as well. And while the various thinkers they criticized have lost much of their contem-
porary relevance, the critiques themselves have not.
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series of bitter feuds over who would become the rightful heir to Freud’s legacy. In 
both cases, the critical space in which Freud had situated his thought was lost.
In the early 1920s, Freud carried out a controversial revision of his theories 
by introducing both the “death drive” and the second topography. Although these 
changes were met with resistance—one might say in the Freudian sense—even by 
Freud’s most loyal followers, who attempted to play down his revisions by attribut-
ing them to personal and historical circumstances, most psychoanalysts eventually 
adopted them. The problem was that no one seemed to agree on their meaning, as 
Freud had provided a number of contradictory accounts of these concepts.2 Start-
ing in the mid- to late-1920s, two antithetical currents of thought began to emerge 
within the psychoanalytic community: one view posited the ego as the fully autono-
mous product of a differentiation from the id, acting as the representative of “real-
ity” and charged with containing the drives; the other view rejected the notion of 
an autonomous ego and instead looked to find its genesis in identification. Conse-
quently, while the first option meant extracting the ego from the id and making it 
the instrument of the individual’s adaptation to “reality,” the second option moved 
the ego closer to the id and sought to show how it developed from the unconscious.3
The first public eruption of these internal debates occurred in 1936 at the 
Marienbad congress between the supporters of Melanie klein and those of Anna 
2 As Bruce Fink points out, there are at least four accounts of the ego found in Freud’s corpus: (1) 
the ego as a projection of the surface of the body; (2) the ego as a precipitate of former object-
cathexes; (3) the ego as the representative of reality in the psyche; and (4) the ego as a part of 
the id that has been specially modified. Cf. Fink, Lacan to the Letter (Minneapolis: university of 
Minnesota Press, 2004), p. 41.
3 While the first view emphasizes consciousness, the second view emphasizes the unconscious. This 
formulation, however, is problematic in that the first topography (unconscious, consciousness, 
preconscious) is not directly identical to the second topography. For example, the ego overlaps 
with both the conscious and unconscious systems, demonstrating the necessity of viewing both 
topographies as consubstantial, rather than as one system displacing the other. Consequently, the 
aforementioned point serves as more of a heuristic value rather than as a precise theoretical one.
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Freud. Whereas klein appeared to emphasize the role of the unconscious, Anna 
Freud emphasized the role of the ego and “reality adaptation.” klein drew on karl 
Abraham’s work on the psychoses, particularly melancholia, where he located their 
origin in early infancy, as well as on Freud’s new theory of the death drive. using 
the revision of Freudianism that had come about in the 1920s, klein began to study 
the first years of life in a child’s psychological development and, as a result of her re-
search, described the very first “object relations”—objects as images endowed with 
the status of fantasy—as they occurred in infancy.4 on the other hand, Anna Freud 
and her “ego psychology” school (Heinz Hartman, Ernst kris, Rudolph Loewen-
stein, et al.) were unwilling to accept the notion that the id could be in charge of 
action, perception, and thought at the outset. Instead, they argued that there ex-
ists an “undifferentiated phase during which both the id and the ego gradually are 
formed,”5 that is, that the ego exists alongside the id from the outset.
no conclusion was reached at Marienbad and the disputes subsided as soon 
as the fourteenth congress came to an end, with klein and her supporters returning 
to London and Anna Freud and her supporters to Vienna. Yet with the rise of fascism 
across continental Europe, many of the Viennese analysts, including Freud himself, 
began to leave Austria en masse with the intention of settling abroad in England. So 
after the Anschluss in 1938 and the outbreak of war in Europe the split between the 
British Psychoanalytical Society (B P S ; allied with klein) and the Viennese school 
(allied with Anna Freud) became an internal one to the B P S .6 As a result, the ten-
4 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 109.
5 Heinz Hartmann, Ernst kris, and Rudolph Loewenstein, “Comments on the Formation of Psy-
chic Structure,” in The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, vol. 2 (new York: International universities 
Press, 1946), p. 19.
6 Phyllis grosskurth, Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 
1987), p. 133.
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sions that had appeared at Marienbad quickly resurfaced in London. The disputes 
reached a boiling point in october 1942—three years after Freud’s death—when 
the series of “Controversial Discussions” erupted. For four years, in the midst of war, 
the disputes once again pitted the kleinians against the Anna-Freudians, threaten-
ing the unity of the international psychoanalytic movement, which now found itself 
confined to the B P S .7 
At first the arguments that took place during the Controversial Discussions 
centered on the appraisal of klein’s theories, which Anna Freud and her follow-
ers contended had strayed too far from Freud’s teaching. Yet this view was difficult 
to reconcile with the fact that, during his lifetime, Freud had never repudiated 
klein’s theories and, in fact, had hinted at his support for them on a number of 
occasions. However, he had stopped short of directly praising her work, perhaps 
feeling obliged not to upset his daughter. And now that he had died it was clearly 
impossible to have him clarify his opinions on the matter. Soon enough, however, 
the debates shifted to the training of analysts. Anna Freud’s party saw the object of 
analysis as the “undoing of the effects of repression” and the “reduction of defense 
mechanisms, in order to give the ego better control over the id,” writes Lacanian 
historian Elisabeth Roudinesco.
Transference should not be analyzed until the defenses have been 
reduced. The training technique corresponded to the intersection of 
the second topography put forward by ego psychology, whose main 
contributions were linked to Anna Freud. She, kris, Hartmann, Loew-
enstein, and the Viennese in general shared the same adaptative [sic] 
view of psychoanalysis…8
on the other hand, the kleinians argued that treatment began with “recognition 
7 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 191.
8 Ibid., p. 193.
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of the primacy of the transferential bond” and the necessity of analyzing it from the 
outset, “regardless of any control the ego might have over the id.”9 Because Mela-
nie klein and Anna Freud’s interpretations of Freudian doctrine proved to be so 
incompatible, the only solution that the B P S  could come up with was to establish 
two different systems of training. In June 1946 the Controversial Discussions came 
to an end when the B P S  officially divided into three groups: group A taught the 
theories of Melanie klein, group B taught those of Anna Freud, and the third group 
consisted of independents.
During the era of the Controversial Discussions, Lacan began to familiarize 
himself with the works of both Melanie klein and Anna Freud, no doubt as a result 
of the importance and scale of the debates themselves. Yet his references to their 
work were, for the most part, sporadic and uncritical. For example, in his 1949 
revision of his mirror stage theory, Lacan wrote of Anna Freud that her work has, 
“against a frequently expressed prejudice,” situated “hysterical repression and its re-
turns at a more archaic stage than obsessive inversion and its isolating processes,”10 
as well as “[forcefully articulated] the function of misrecognition that characterizes the 
ego in all the defensive structures.”11 A year earlier, in his paper, “Aggressiveness in 
Psychoanalysis,” Lacan makes a positive reference to Melanie klein’s theory of “bad 
internal objects”12 writing that
Through klein we have become aware of the function of the imaginary 
primordial enclosure formed by the imago of the mother’s body…[T]
hrough her we have the mapping, drawn by children’s own hands, 
9 Ibid.
10 Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experi-
ence” [1949], in Écrits, p. 79.
11 Ibid., p. 80.
12 Lacan, “Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis” [1948], in Écrits, p. 89.
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of the mother’s inner empire, and the historical atlas of the internal 
divisions in which the imagos of the father and siblings—whether real 
or virtual—and the subject’s own voracious aggression dispute their 
deleterious hold over her sacred regions.13
In both instances, Lacan praises various aspects of klein’s and Anna Freud’s work, 
particularly that which he found useful to his own project, which for now was still 
limited to the construction of a theory of the Imaginary order, with the mirror stage 
as its paradigm. Accordingly, Lacan made only limited use of their work by integrat-
ing various aspects of each into his pre-existing theoretical framework.
nevertheless, Lacan’s familiarization with the works of klein and Anna Freud 
during this period signals the beginning of an important shift in his work, a shift 
that anticipates his “epistemological break” in 1952: the shift towards structuralism. 
But despite his increasing focus on the psychoanalytic theories and techniques be-
ing discussed and practiced in the I PA , Lacan never renounced the importance 
of the French thinkers who inspired his work. Instead, he oscillated between the 
“international” debates within the psychoanalytic community and the French intel-
lectual currents, neither of which he was ever wholly a part of (to the extent that he 
was looked on with suspicion by both groups). This is why it would be impossible to 
conceive of Lacan’s critiques of Melanie klein and Anna Freud apart from the work 
of Claude Lévi-Strauss.
T H E  L I n g u I S T I C  T u R n
Born in Brussels in 1908, Lévi-Strauss grew up in Paris and later attended 
the Sorbonne, where he studied law and philosophy. After receiving his degree, he 
13 Ibid., pp. 93-94.
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chose to go abroad instead of continuing his studies in France, but, curiously, not 
in the official capacity of an anthropologist. From 1935 to 1939 Lévi-Strauss lived 
in Brazil, where his informal ethnographic fieldwork took the shape of a genuine 
“philosophical inquiry” not unlike that of Descartes’s, a philosopher whose travels 
also played a decisive role in the development of his work. Through his studies of 
the various Brazilian tribes he lived with, Lévi-Strauss came to deduce the prin-
ciple of “structure” by acknowledging the existence of universal “reason” within the 
various myths and marriage systems he encountered.14 By starting from the formal 
operation of “transcendentally reducing”15 the empirical consciousness of both the 
observer and the observed, Lévi-Strauss’s methodology contributed to an intellec-
tual revolution—the advent of structuralism—which, like mathematics, is achieved 
only when the formal sets of elements and relations can be extracted by excluding 
all positive content.16
Before the publication in 1949 of Lévi-Strauss’s The Elementary Structures of Kin-
ship, which sought to definitively answer the question of incest-prohibition through 
the structuralist approach, the cultural anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski had 
travelled to the South Pacific to live amongst the Trobriand Islanders. After four 
years of study, Malinowski returned from the South Seas and set out to overhaul 
Freud’s work, focusing in particular on the role of the oedipus complex in psycho-
analytic theory. Freud had argued that the oedipus complex and its triangular struc-
ture were a “natural” universal, deriving their effectiveness from the incest taboo as 
14 karatani, Transcritique, pp. 84-85.
15 See Husserl notion of “eidetic reduction,” in which the determinations of empirical self-evidence 
are “bracketed” through the process of doubt that problematizes those given beings, with the 
transcendental ego of self-reflection implied as a result.
16 karatani, Transcritique, p. 86.
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the necessary condition of all culture. In order to substantiate this view, Freud drew 
upon the Darwinian myth of the primordial horde, arguing in Totem and Taboo that 
the origin of culture was founded on an act of patricide. However, based on his re-
search of the Trobriand Islanders, whose social structure, he had observed, was of a 
matrilineal type in which the role of the father in procreation came to be ignored, 
Malinowski questioned the universality of the oedipus complex and the validity of 
Freud’s “totemic myth,” arguing instead that the formation of the oedipus complex 
was dependent on the family structure typical of the society in question.17 His find-
ings led to a controversial debate within the psychoanalytic community regarding 
the status of anthropological research, although the debate never reached France 
or the S P P . While the orthodox Freudians continued to assert the validity of a uni-
versal oedipus complex using new fieldwork conducted by geza Roheim, which 
contradicted Malinowski’s reports, the culturalists argued that the incest taboo did 
not arise from a universally recognized principle due to the diversity of social struc-
tures in which the elementary matrix of the oedipus complex did not exist.18
But in 1949 Lévi-Strauss’s work shed new light on the question of incest pro-
hibition in a way that completely shifted the terms of the debate. Instead of argu-
ing that there is a “natural” or a priori fear of incest or pointing to the nominalist 
reduction of the incest taboo as a product of cultural diversity, Lévi-Strauss claimed 
that the prohibition of incest provided the very transition from nature to culture. 
“The prohibition of incest is in origin neither purely cultural nor purely natural,” 
he wrote.
nor is it a composite mixture of elements from both nature and cul-
17 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 207.
18 Ibid.
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ture. It is the fundamental step because of which, by which, but above 
all in which, the transition from nature to culture is accomplished. In 
one sense, it belongs to nature, for it is a general condition of culture. 
Consequently, we should not be surprised that its formal characteris-
tic, universality, has been taken from nature.19
If the prohibition of incest is neither purely cultural nor purely natural for Lé-
vi-Strauss, this is because it is located in the (transcendental) gap between both 
“orders,” the limit point at which they become irreducible to one another. Con-
sequently, by “bracketing” nature and treating the systems of marriage exchange 
and kinship as “reasonable,” Lévi-Strauss uncovered the formal structure of social 
organization independent of empirical consciousness. In doing so, he seemingly 
validated Freud’s claim regarding the universal status of the oedipus complex, to 
the extent that it was derived, not from a phylogenetic origin as in orthodox Freud-
ianism, but instead from the existence of a symbolic function understood as the Law 
governing the (unconscious) organization of the social structure, such as in mar-
riage exchange and kinship ties.
But Lévi-Strauss was also highly critical of Freudian psychoanalysis. He com-
pared psychoanalytic treatment to shamanism and argued that its function was pri-
marily mythological, acting as a system of collective interpretation in Western societ-
ies:
A considerable danger thus arises: the treatment (unbeknown to the 
therapist, naturally), far from leading to the resolution of a specific 
disturbance within its own context, is reduced to the reorganization 
of the patient’s universe in terms of psychoanalytic interpretations.20
If a cure is arrived at through psychoanalysis, then its efficacy is predominantly sym-
19 Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, trans. James H. Bell (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1969), p. 24.
20 Lévi-Strauss, “The Sorcerer and His Magic,” in Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire Jacobson and 
Brooke Schoepf (new York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 183.
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bolic because of the structural reorganization brought about by the collective adop-
tion of the myth. Hence, in his Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, Lévi-Strauss 
defends Mauss’s characterization of the unconscious as “collective,” in contrast to its 
mythical Jungian association, by conceiving of it as a purely formal (empty) place in 
which the symbolic function achieves autonomy.21 “Like language,” he wrote, “the 
social is an autonomous reality (the same one, moreover); symbols are more real 
than what they symbolize, the signifier precedes and determines the signified.”22
Since “Beyond the ‘Reality Principle’,” Lacan had taken an interest in speech 
and language, but, prior to the work of Lévi-Strauss, lacked an adequate theory to 
understand its relationship to psychoanalysis. Thus he came to view language prin-
cipally through the lens of phenomenology and intersubjectivity. Describing the 
influence that Lévi-Strauss’s work had on his own, Lacan wrote:
If I wanted to describe how I’ve been helped and supported by Lévi-
Strauss’s thinking, I’d say it resides in the stress he has laid…on what 
I shall call the function of the signifier (in the sense that the word 
has in linguistics), inasmuch as this signifier, I’d say, not only is distin-
guishable by its own laws but also prevails over the signified on which 
it imposes them.23
Although he had been introduced to Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Lin-
guistics years earlier, it was through Lévi-Strauss that Lacan was initiated into Sau-
ssure’s system, the principles of structural linguistics, and, perhaps most importantly, 
the dichotomy between the signifier and the signified. Thus, in order to understand 
Lacan’s linguistic turn, one must first grasp the basics of Saussurean linguistics.
For Saussure, language is a social system governed by difference. “In lan-
21 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 211.
22 Lévi-Strauss, Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss (new York: Routledge, 1987), p. 37.
23 Lacan, “Sur Les Rapports entre le mythologie et le rituel,” in Bulletin de la Société française de phi-
losophie 3 (1956): p. 114.
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guage,” he wrote, “there are only differences, and without positive terms.”24 Saussure’s 
emphasis on “differences” was made not only in reference to within a single relation-
al system, but also without—to the existence of “the other,” that is, different systems 
of languages.25 It may be said, then, that Saussure’s structural linguistics functioned 
as a (kantian) critique of two opposing tendencies in the field: on the one hand, 
Wilhelm von Humboldt’s theory of language considered as a self-contained and 
internally coherent Volksgeist, and, on the other hand, historical linguistics, which 
observed the transformation of language over time as a natural and scientific devel-
opment independent of consciousness. Accordingly, Saussure’s unique approach 
was to reject the internal consistency of language against the former, while simultane-
ously to affirm it as an enclosed synchronic system against the latter.26 In doing so, 
Saussure came to extract a theory of language qua relational structure broken down 
into its constituent differential elements—the sign—as the product of the “synthe-
sis” between the signifier (the sensible) and the signified (the suprasensible).
T R A n S P o S I T I o n
When Louis Althusser argued that Marx had been fundamentally misun-
derstood, his contention was that the errors of the various interpretations resulted 
from the mistaken view that Marx’s body of work could be understood as a coher-
ent whole. Instead, Althusser, drawing on gaston Bachelard, held that it contains 
a radical “break”—a shift to a fundamentally different problematic, i.e., a different 
24 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (new York: Mcgraw-Hill, 
1959), p. 120.
25 karatani, Transcritique, p. 79.
26 Ibid.
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theoretical framework, set of questions posed, and central propositions.27 The same 
happens to be true for Lacan (and, as I affirmed earlier, for Freud as well), whose 
works are marked by not just one, but by a multitude, of incessant shifts in theoretical 
perspective.28 With respect to this fundamental thesis, Jacques-Alain Miller writes:
In the Écrits, Lacan provides a clue as to his intellectual trajectory 
in saying that he considers that his work, the work associated with 
his name, began in 1952: what came before counted in his mind as 
his “antecedents.” He doesn’t thereby cancel out what came before, 
but stresses a cut in his own intellectual development that occurred 
around 1952-1953. The starting point of his teaching was “Function 
and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” a paper written 
for a 1953 conference in Rome.29
From roughly 1936 to 1949 Lacan’s theoretical focus had been chiefly oriented 
around the Imaginary order (the mirror stage) and phenomenology. But starting in 
1952/53 with the publication of “Function and Field,” Lacan—not unlike Marx in 
1848—began to pose an entirely new set of questions. After his encounter with the 
works of Lévi-Strauss and, through him, those of Ferdinand de Saussure and Roman 
Jakobson, Lacan broke with his earlier work by shifting his focus from the Imaginary 
to the Symbolic order—that is, towards an elaboration of a theory of the signifier 
and its determining role in the unconscious qua symbolic structure.
But Lacan’s “epistemological break” (his transcendental turn) cannot simply 
be attributed to his oscillation between the competing versions of psychoanalytic 
theory practiced in the I PA  and French social theory. This would not have provoked 
27 Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1998), 
pp. 25-28.
28 Jacques-Alain Miller periodicizes Lacan in the following manner: there is the Lacan of the Imagi-
nary (1930s—1940s), of the Symbolic (1950s—mid-1960s), and of the Real (mid-1960s—late-
1970s). These three “epistemological breaks” coincide with each of the three rings of the “Bor-
romean knot,” meaning that each moment is mutually reinforcing, as opposed to a series of 
Aufhebungs.
29 Miller, “An Introduction to Seminars I and II: Lacan’s orientation Prior to 1953 (I),” in Reading 
Seminars I and II: Lacan’s Return to Freud, ed. Bruce Fink, et al. (Albany: SunY Press, 1996), p. 4.
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a radical break with his earlier work, which was already defined by such a split. To 
understand how such a break could occur, one should look again at Marx, whose 
critical work is defined by his constant “transposition.” Take for example his critique 
of “german ideology” after his migration to France, his critique of French “utopian 
socialism” after his migration to England, and finally his critique of English politi-
cal economy after his exile from germany in 1848. And while Lacan remained in 
France throughout most of his life,30 each new stage in his career was marked by a 
moment of institutional crisis. Such a crisis occurred on June 16, 1953 when Lacan, 
along with a number of other French psychoanalysts, resigned from the S P P  over 
the increasingly authoritarian rules governing the training of analysts. Consequent-
ly, the exiled group of former S P P  analysts decided to form the Société Française de 
Psychanalyse (S F P ), but in abandoning the S P P  they unknowingly ceased to remain 
members of the I PA .31
on July 8, Lacan inaugurated the new society with a lecture, “The Symbolic, 
the Imaginary, and the Real,” which began a new phase of his thought marked by 
the influence of structuralism. And it was in “The Function and Field of Speech 
and Language in Psychoanalysis,” originally delivered as a speech at the Rome Con-
gress in September 1953, that Lacan for the first time drew on Saussure’s distinc-
tion between the signifier and the signified when he proposed that “the subject’s 
unconscious is the other’s discourse,”32 by which he meant the linguistic or symbolic 
30 From 1953 until 1964 (another year of institutional crisis), Lacan’s seminars took place at the 
Hôpital Sainte-Anne, where his psychiatric career had begun in 1926. This refusal to move is 
strikingly similar to kant’s self-imposed exile in königsberg, which can be read as its own kind of 
transposition. 
31 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, pp. 201-202.
32 Lacan, “Function and the Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” [1953], in Écrits, p. 
219.
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“other.” This distinction allowed Lacan a radical reinterpretation of Freud’s theory 
of the unconscious:
We must thus take up Freud’s work again starting with the Traumdeu-
tung [The Interpretation of Dreams] to remind ourselves that a dream has 
the structure of a sentence or, rather, to keep to the letter of the work, 
of rebus—that is, of a form of writing... What is important is the ver-
sion of the text, and that, Freud tells us, is given in the telling of the 
dream—that is, in its rhetoric.33
From Lacan’s perspective, Freud’s work provided, in great detail, an analysis of the 
various ways in which the unconscious is “structured like a language,” yet Freud 
himself was unaware of this as he had lacked a coherent theory of language and, as 
a result, his discovery remained inchoate. Accordingly, Lacan remarks that “[t]o ig-
nore the symbolic order is to condemn Freud’s discovery to forgetting and analytic 
experience to ruin.”34 This is because, according to Lacan, unconscious meaning, 
or “signification,” is a function of signifiers.35 Thus, in “The Instance of the Letter 
in the unconscious, or Reason Since Freud” [1957], Lacan, borrowing from Ro-
man Jakobson’s phonemic theory, reinterprets Freud’s concepts of “condensation” 
and “displacement” as two fundamental combinations of signifiers: metaphor and 
metonymy.
With the introduction of the Symbolic order into his architectonic,36 Lacan 
came to formulate for the first time the triadic structure of the Real, the Symbolic, 
33 Ibid., p. 221.
34 Ibid., p. 227.
35 For Lacan, signifiers, which compose the symbolic order and which are discernable in the analysis 
of dreams, jokes, and slips of the tongue, are not limited to just words, since any object in the hu-
man sphere is marked by language and thus functions as a signifying element.
36 Following Lorenzo Chiesa, I have tried to show how the Symbolic order is composed of three 
distinct components: (1) language as a structure (as in structural linguistics); (2) the symbolic 
order as the legal fabric of human culture (as in Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology); and (3) 
the Freudian unconscious as reformulated by Lacan. Cf. Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philo-
sophical Reading of Lacan (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), p. 35.
39T H E  L A C A N I A N  T U R N :  T R A N S P O S I T I O N  A N D  C R I T I Q U E
and the Imaginary.37 If there is any meaning to Lacan’s repeated exhortation for a 
“return to Freud” beyond simply the return to reading Freud, it lies in the fact that 
Lacan sought to recover the transcendental core of Freud’s discovery: his attempt 
to grasp through language what exists in the gap between the unconscious and con-
sciousness. As  Freud  himself had argued in Moses and Monotheism [1939]:
Thought-processes, and what may be analogous to them in the Id, are 
unconscious per se and obtain their entry into consciousness by their 
connection, via the function of speech, with memory traces of percep-
tions through touch and ear.38
Thus Lacan, like Freud, came to extract a theory of the unconscious qua transcen-
dental structure: transcendental because the Lacanian categories of the Real, the 
Symbolic, and the Imaginary—like Freud’s ego, superego, and id—are not things 
that exist in empirical reality, but are figures about which we can only say that they 
exist. They are a nothing that exists only as a certain function.39 But Lacan’s transcen-
dental stance could not have appeared if it had not been for his encounter with the 
“pronounced parallax” between the theories of Melanie klein and Anna Freud. In 
Lacan’s work, this parallax came to take the form of an “antinomy,” the device to 
reveal both thesis and antithesis as an illusion.
C R I T I Q u E
Although “Function and Field” contains no direct references to either Anna 
37 Lacan, “Function and Field,” in Écrits, p. 204.
38 Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. katherine Jones (new York: Vintage Books, 1967) p. 124.
39 karatani argues that Lacan’s R.S.I. schema and kant’s architectonic of the cognitive faculties are 
isomorphic: the Lacanian Imaginary/kantian illusion, the Symbolic/the kantian form, and the 
Real/the thing-in-itself. karatani performs a similar operation with respect to Freud’s second 
topography, reading it as id/sensibility, ego/understanding, and superego/reason. Cf. karatani, 
Transcritique, pp. 32-33.
40 P A R T  I I
Freud or Melanie klein, the same is not true for Seminar I, Freud’s Papers on Tech-
nique.40 “The seminar could be said to be an application of ‘Function and Field’ 
to psychoanalytic technique or practice,” writes Miller. “In some sense it answers 
the question, ‘what psychoanalytic technique can be deduced from the thesis: the 
unconscious is structured like a language?’ If we admit that the unconscious is so 
structured, how can we practice psychoanalysis?”41 But while it is true that the semi-
nar and the écrits ought to be read together, Lacan provided another clue as to 
how to read Seminars I and II in his introduction to Seminar I—a clue that Miller 
overlooks:
Those who find themselves in a position to follow Freud are confront-
ed with the question as to how the paths we inherit were adopted, 
reapprehended, and rethought through. So, we cannot do anything 
else but gather together what we will contribute to it under the head-
ing of a critique, a critique of analytic technique.42
As Lacan argues, Seminar I ought to be read above all as a critique: more specifi-
cally, as a critique of Melanie klein and Anna Freud and their respective analytic 
techniques. Thus, in the chapter “Discourse Analysis and Ego Analysis: Anna Freud 
or Melanie klein,” Lacan poses the two against each other through a restatement of 
the basic antinomy: that the ego is, on the one hand, conceived as an autonomous 
function (Anna Freud), while, on the other hand, it is also understood as the seat of 
illusion and error (klein). Before going further in the analysis, however, klein’s and 
Anna Freud’s opposing techniques require further explication.
First, Anna Freud’s technique is based on the analysis of the ego’s resistance 
40 A peculiar feature of Lacan’s work is that, like the Lacanian subject itself, it is divided between 
speech (the seminars) on the one hand and language (the écrits) on the other.
41 Miller, Reading Seminars I and II, p. 4.
42 Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953-1954, trans. John For-
rester (new York: W. W. norton, 1991), pp. 15-16.
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and defenses during transference. Accordingly, ego psychology starts from the stand-
point of the analysand’s empirical consciousness by bracketing the unconscious, 
insofar as it is unobservable outside of the Imaginary dual relation (the analyst’s 
and analysand’s egos). Describing Anna Freud’s technique in greater detail, Lacan 
remarks:
Anna Freud’s point of view is intellectualist, and leads her into putting 
forward the view that everything in analysis must be conducted from 
a median, moderate position, which would be that of the ego. For her 
everything starts with the education or the persuasion of the ego, and 
everything must come back to that.43
For Anna Freud analysis begins and ends with the ego: its resistances, its defenses, 
and its effects. Ego psychology therefore seeks to dispel the ego of its illusions by 
forcing it to adapt to the “reality” of the analyst’s ego. Lacan later criticizes this posi-
tion by disparagingly referring to it as the “servicing of goods,” since it substitutes 
one good (the analyst's) for the analysand's. But his overarching critique of Anna 
Freud in Seminar I, derived in part from his theory of the mirror stage, is that she 
and the ego psychologists overlook the fact that, by its very nature and function, the 
ego is nothing other than misrecognition: its basic function is to misrecognize.44
on the other hand, Melanie klein’s technique begins from the “diametri-
cally opposite starting point.”45 By bracketing the ego (something that she, as Lacan 
points out, does not even bother to theorize) klein begins with an a priori analysis of 
the unconscious: she “accepts [the unconscious] from the start, out of habit.”46 In 
other words, kleinian analysis, in bypassing the ego’s defenses and resistances, im-
43 Ibid., p. 67.
44 Ibid., p. 194.
45 Ibid., p. 67.
46 Ibid., pp. 82-85.
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mediately begins with a “deep” analysis of the analysand’s unconscious, as in the case 
of her analysis of a four-year-old schizophrenic boy named Dick in “The Importance 
of Symbol-Formation in the Formation of the Ego.”47 As a result, klein overlooks 
the structural necessity (and therefore the necessary analysis) of resistance during 
transference, which Lacan argues (in Seminar II) is “linked to the register of the 
ego” and is “an effect of the ego,” yet irreducibly expresses an unconscious desire.48 
Furthermore, klein—no doubt as a result of her overlooking the very structure of 
the transference—is led to theorize the unconscious (for her, the realm of phantasy 
constituted through identification) entirely within the register of the Imaginary.
What Lacan’s critique reveals is that the seemingly irreconcilable opposi-
tion between Melanie klein and Anna Freud serves instead to obfuscate their dis-
avowed proximity, insofar as both of their techniques, whether they emphasize the 
unconscious (klein) or of the ego (Anna Freud), are limited to the Imaginary or-
der. Hence the significance Lacan attributes to the Symbolic in analytic technique. 
Lacan’s position is that, if nothing else, our thought is always bound by language. 
In kantian terms, this is the “transcendental standpoint” towards language,49 which 
Fredric Jameson elucidates in his analysis of the Lacanian categories of the Imagi-
nary and the Symbolic:
What is so often problematical about psychoanalytic criticism is there-
fore not its insistence on the subterranean relationships between the 
literary text on the one hand and the “obsessive metaphor” or the 
distant and inaccessible childhood or unconscious fascination on the 
other: it is rather the absence of any reflection on the transformation-
al process whereby such private materials become public—a transfor-
47 Ibid.
48 Lacan, The Seminar, Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55, 
trans. Sylvana Tomaselli, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (new York: W. W. norton, 1991) p. 228.
49 karatani, Transcritique, p. 82.
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mation which is often, to be sure, so undramatic and inconspicuous 
as the very act of speech itself.50
The transcendental position, overlooked by both Melanie klein and Anna Freud, 
is that the structure of the unconscious can only be grasped in the gap between our 
unconscious thoughts (klein) and our everyday consciousness (Anna Freud): in 
other words, the fields of speech and language, the locus of the signifier. And it is 
only through language that desire, according to Lacan, is constituted (one of his 
most oft-repeated dictums is, “man’s desire is the desire of the other,”51 by which he 
refers to the field of language).
In that sense, just as kant, by way of his critique of pure reason, came to ex-
tract symbolic-form through transcendental reflection (and, for that matter, mutatis 
mutandis for Marx and the concept of value-form),52 Lacan—following Freud’s fo-
cus on the unconscious Wunsch—came to extract the form of desire as the basis upon 
which psychoanalytic technique is premised. But what is crucial about this is that 
the transcendental standpoint inevitably accompanies a certain kind of subjectivity, 
one that goes beyond the illusion of a substantial ego. However, in order to grasp 
why this is the case, one must proceed by way of a detour back through linguistics.
A P P E R C E P T I o n  A n D  E T H I C S
As put forward earlier, for Saussure a word is the product of the “synthesis” 
50 Jameson, “Imaginary and Symbolic,” Yale French Studies no. 55/56 (1977): p. 339.
51 Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. 
Alan Sheridan, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (new York: W. W. norton, 1981), p. 235.
52 karatani, Transcritique, p. 195. one interesting point of comparison between Marx and Lacan 
here is the isomorphism between transference and the process of exchange: in the latter, the 
confrontation between buyer and seller generates value; in the former, the other’s desire is es-
tablished in the confrontation between analyst and analysand.
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between the signifier and the signified. But this presupposes a subject who is ca-
pable of such a synthesis—in Lacanian terms, the opposition between the subject 
of the statement (analytic judgment) and the subject of the enunciation (synthetic 
judgment). In this way, both Saussurean linguistics and structuralism take as their 
premise what kant called “transcendental apperception X,” i.e., the spontaneous “I 
think” that must accompany all of one’s representations through the “synthesis” of 
the structure.53 Like the Cartesian cogito, it is a nothingness that constitutes the struc-
ture of the system. Thus, when Roman Jakobson expanded upon Saussure’s struc-
tural linguistics through his elaboration of phoneme theory, he was forced to intro-
duce the “zero phoneme,” derived from the mathematical unit e, as a restatement 
of transcendental subjectivity in order to complete his phonemic system.54 And the 
same is true for Lacan who, like Husserl, begins with a clear distinction between 
two egos: on the one hand, the Imaginary ego as empirical consciousness; on the 
other hand, the Symbolic (phenomenological) “I” of the subject’s discourse, which 
“transcendentally reduces” the Imaginary ego through the unveiling of the uncon-
scious qua symbolic structure. But crucial here is the (third) subject that emerges 
as a result of the transcendental reduction—the barred subject [S ̸]—the subject of 
enunciation qua synthetic judgment. As Bruce Fink argues in The Lacanian Subject:
The subject is split between ego and unconscious, between conscious 
and unconscious… [But t]he subject is nothing but this very split… [The 
barred subject] consists entirely in the fact that a speaking being’s 
two “parts” or avatars share no common ground: they are radically 
separated.55
53 Ibid., p. 77.
54 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
55 Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 
1996), p. 45. It is worth noting a peculiar fact that both Freud and Husserl use the term “Splitting 
of the Ego” (Ich-Spaltung). But only in Lacanian theory does the connection between their two 
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But importantly, Lacan does not start out from the position of a “split” or “barred” 
subject. As Lorenzo Chiesa points out, there is a shift in Lacan’s thought between 
“The Freudian Thing, or the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis” [1955] and Semi-
nar VII [1959-1960], The Ethics of Psychoanalysis.56 While Lacan had previously identi-
fied the unconscious as fully reducible to the signifier, by the time of Seminar VII, 
Lacan reconceives the subject as an empty place identical to transcendental apper-
ception (subjectivity), which “bundles” together the functions of the transcendental 
structure (Lacan’s R.S.I. schema).
A similar “split” can be discerned at the level of analytic technique. Psycho-
analysis is premised on the analyst/analysand relationship. But this relationship is 
not a hierarchical one: although the analyst occupies the “teaching” position, it is 
subordinated to the analysand’s demand for understanding.57 Accordingly, there is 
no “harmonious” relationship, no rapport, between the two: in transference, rather, 
there is a certain “drive” towards misrecognition. The analyst/analysand relation-
ship—like all communication—is therefore constitutively asymmetrical. The prob-
lematic “synthesis” between the radically split “sensibility” and “understanding” in 
analytic technique (between analysand/analyst) thus entails what kant called “a 
priori synthetic judgment.” For Lacan, analysis ends when the analysand carries out 
an “act”—a salto mortale—that “traverses the fantasy,”58 the moment when the analy-
uses become clear. Cf. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, 
trans. Dorion Cairns (Boston: Martinus nijhoff Publishers, 1960), p. 35 and Sigmund Freud, 
“Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense,” S.E. XXIII (1938).
56 Lorenzo Chiesa, Subjectivity and Otherness, p. 5.
57 karatani, Transcritique, p. 72.
58 The model that Lacan uses to depict “traversing the fantasy,” introduced in Seminar XII [1964-
1965], is the Möbius strip. This model provides both a spatial and temporal structure of analysis: in 
it oppositions (such as analyst/analysand) are seen as part of a continuous movement.
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sand understands that fantasy functions to screen the inconsistency or lack in “the 
other.”59 But the question of how one, in general, ought to act is above all an ethical 
question—and it is a question that Lacan never stopped thinking about.
In Seminar XI Lacan argued that “[t]he status of the unconscious…is 
ethical.”60 But his interest in ethics can arguably be seen as early as 1955, as seen in 
“The Freudian Thing” where Lacan interprets Freud’s enigmatic statement, “Wo es 
war, soll ich werden,” as an ethical injunction: not “the ego should conquer the id,” 
as the ego psychologists had translated it, but “Where it was itself, it is my duty that 
I come into being.”61 According to Lacan, the ethics of psychoanalysis lie neither in 
the “service of goods” (eudemonism/utilitarianism) nor in pronouncing judgment 
on the “Sovereign good” (metaphysics). So whereas Anna Freud’s ego psychology 
espouses a normative ethics of “reality adaptation” (the former) and Melanie klein’s 
technique aims at elevating the mother’s body to the sublime status of “the Thing” 
(the latter),62 Lacanian technique forces the analysand to approach the site of an 
unbearable, unconscious truth that is “beyond the pleasure principle” by confront-
ing them with the elementary deadlocks of their desire. Thus, “[i]nsofar as Freud’s 
position constitutes progress here, the question of ethics is to be articulated from 
the point of view of the location of man in relation to the Real.”63
59 Cf. Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989).
60 Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 33.
61 Lacan, “The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis” [1955], 
in Écrits, pp. 347-348.
62 This is a reversal of Julia kristeva’s claim that the Lacanian signifier, read as the eidos, belongs to 
the field of metaphysics. Rather, the signifier belongs to the transcendental field, whereas klei-
nian phantasy, insofar as it relies on the central presupposition of the good/Bad dichotomy vis-
à-vis the primordial lost object, is metaphysical. Cf. kristeva, Melanie Klein, trans. Ross guberman 
(new York: Columbia university Press, 2002), p. 140.
63 Lacan, Seminar VII, p. 11.
47T H E  L A C A N I A N  T U R N :  T R A N S P O S I T I O N  A N D  C R I T I Q U E
For Lacan, then, ethics necessarily entails an encounter with the problematic 
of “the other”: in other words, the Real, the kantian “thing-in-itself.” For both kant 
and Lacan, there is a certain “non-ethical” kernel within ethics itself that appears 
as a “rupture” or discontinuity—one that is experienced as impossible.64 Ethics only 
comes into play when the encounter with the Real forces upon us the question: 
“Have you acted in conformity with the desire which inhabits you?,”65 in a clear af-
finity to kant’s proposition, “act as if the maxim of your action were to become by 
your will a universal law of nature.”66 This is because, for Lacan, desire aims at what 
is impossible, what he refers to in Seminar VII as das Ding.67 And, as Alenka Zupančič 
notes, analysis unfolds in the register of desire, which gives support to the “funda-
mental fantasy” that the subject must “traverse” in order to become a subject as such.68 
Accordingly, the transcendental position, which began with the “pronounced paral-
lax” between the position of the subject and the position of the other, inexorably 
entails the problematic of alterity: the alterity of the other—the Lacanian Real. In 
this sense, the transcendental attitude is always already ethical.
Both Freud and Lacan have been traditionally misunderstood as hav-
ing proposed a set of positive doctrines, methodologies, and clinical practices situ-
64 Alenka Zupančič, Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan (London: Verso, 2000), pp. 234-235.
65 Lacan, Seminar VII, p. 314.
66 kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
university Press, 1998), p. 31, 4:421.
67 By 1963, Lacan reformulated his notion of the Real by replacing “das Ding” with the notion of 
the objet petit a, which can be read as homologous to kant’s “transcendental object = X.” Cf. Žižek, 
Tarrying with the Negative (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993).
68 Zupančič, Ethics of the Real, p. 239.
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ated within a coherent school of thought.69 This view, however, overlooks the fact 
that, as I have argued above, their work exists primarily as a critique of previously 
existing thought. As critiques, both are marked, if only “latently” in the Freudian 
sense, by what Louis Althusser called “epistemological break”: a shift to a fundamen-
tally different theoretical framework and central set of questions posed. Thus the 
various attempts at “synthesizing” the totality of their work into systems have only 
resulted in dogmatism—and thus the loss of the critical space proper in which they 
had situated themselves.
Arguably the most famous (non-“heretical”) split within Freudian psycho-
analysis was that between Melanie klein and Anna Freud during the era of the 
Controversial Discussions. Both thinkers claimed legitimacy to Freud’s work, yet, 
in placing contrasting emphasis on two of Freud’s topographies (klein relied more 
heavily on the first topography, while Anna Freud relied on the second), were radi-
cally opposed and ultimately irreconcilable. It was amidst this crisis that Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, as a critique of these two dominant positions, came into existence. 
At the level of form, the same happens to be true for kant as well: the transcenden-
tal position only emerged out of what kant referred to as the “pronounced paral-
lax” between, on the one hand, Leibnizian/Wolffian rationalism, and on the other 
hand, Humean skepticism.70 Thus in “Dreams of a Visionary Explained by Dreams 
of Metaphysics” [1766], written more than a decade before the Critique of Pure Rea-
69 In Freud’s case, the disparate paths travelled by his followers were united by their mutual aim of 
constructing an edifice known as “Freudianism” out of his work: for example, a theory of self (ego 
psychology), a theory of objects (object relations), a theory of collectivity (mass psychology), and 
even a theory of aesthetics (applied psychoanalysis).
70 As karatani demonstrates in Transcritique, the same holds true for Marx’s critique of the political 
economy, which functioned as a critique of both the Ricardian and neoclassical schools by way of 
demonstrating how their opposition was inherent to the process of circulation itself.
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son, kant wrote:
Formerly I viewed human common sense only from the standpoint of 
my own; now I put myself into the position of another’s reason outside 
myself, and observe my judgments, together with their most secret 
causes, from the point of view of others. It is true that the comparison 
of both observations results in pronounced parallax, but it is the only 
means of preventing the optical delusion, and of putting the concept 
of the power of knowledge in human nature into its true place.71
As kojin karatani argues, kant is not simply reiterating the commonplace regarding 
seeing oneself from another’s perspective. The “parallax gap,” rather, undermines 
the internal consistency both of one’s own subjective position as well as another’s. 
It thus involves an encounter with the radical alterity of “the other.” This can be 
grasped by way of kant’s first critique: out of the parallax between empiricism and 
rationalism, kant realized that he was not dealing merely with two opposed schools 
of thought, but rather with two fundamental faculties of human reason itself.72 Thus 
with kant “parallax” came to take the form of antinomy, the inscription of the “al-
terity of the other” by means of which the limits of human reason come to be estab-
lished through reason’s self-scrutiny.
A similar gesture is inherent to both Freud and Lacan. Just as Freudian psy-
choanalysis is as different from empirical psychology as it is from Jung’s “collective 
unconscious,” Lacanian psychoanalysis is just as much a critique of Anna Freud’s 
ego psychology as it is a critique of kleinian psychoanalysis. Against the former, 
Lacan rejected the notion that the unconscious is limited to the domain of the ego’s 
Imaginary resistances and defenses, while simultaneously he affirmed the impor-
tance of the ego’s resistances in analysis against the latter. Both positions, however, 
71 kant, “Dreams of a Visionary Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics,” in The Philosophy of Kant (new 
York: Modern Library, 1994), p. 15.
72 karatani, Transcritique, p. 47.
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were united in that they overlooked the constitutive dimension of the unconscious: 
the domain of language. Thus by means of his (trans)critique, as well as his intro-
duction to structuralism (Saussure, Jakobson, and Lévi-Strauss), Lacan rediscovered 
the radical core of Freudian psychoanalysis: not the notion that the unconscious 
determines much of human behavior, but rather Freud’s attempt to grasp the gap 
between the unconscious and consciousness through the form of language.73 In do-
ing so, Lacan came to extract the form of desire as the transcendental basis upon 
which psychoanalysis is founded.
At the same time, Lacan’s transcritical position, like that of kant’s, necessar-
ily led him towards the question of ethics. This is because the domain of ethics is 
intimately bound up with the universality of analytic technique, the subject of his 
critique in Seminars I and II. Yet Lacan’s 1953 structuralist turn, brought about by 
his transposition in the form of an institutional crisis within the S P P , led him to con-
clude—like a number of other structuralists—that the problematic of subjectivity 
had been resolved through the elaboration of the structure as wholly determinative. 
It was not until a decade later that Lacan, after being “excommunicated” from the 
S F P , began a return to the subject of the unconscious: in other words, the Cartesian 
subject.
73 Ibid., p. 32.
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In 1955, around the same time that he began his structuralist turn, Lacan 
gave a brief presentation on Edgar Allen Poe’s famous short story “The Purloined 
Letter,” the third of three detective stories featuring the fictional C. Auguste Dupin, 
an amateur Parisian detective and something of a Sherlock Holmes avant la lettre. In 
Poe’s story, Dupin is contracted by the Prefect of the Police to track down a stolen 
letter, which is being used for political blackmail. The police launch a series of inves-
tigations using logical methods based on both past experience and established sys-
tems of thought, but are in the end unsuccessful at finding the letter because, as Du-
pin discovers by means of self-reflection (“It is merely,” says the unnamed narrator 
to Dupin, “an identification of the reasoner’s intellect with that of his opponent”1), 
the culprit was an especially clever man who, taking into account the elaborate tech-
niques used by the police, knew to hide the letter in plain sight.
Lacan’s exegesis of Poe’s text can (and should) be read as an application of 
his early structuralist theory of the unconscious, principally expounded in his écrits 
1 Edgar Allen Poe, “The Purloined Letter,” in The Purloined Poe, edited by John P. Muller and Wil-
liam J. Richardson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins university Press, 1988), p. 15.
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“on a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” [1957]. Accordingly, 
Lacan came to interpret the purloined letter as a “pure signifier,” a signifier without 
a signified, that symbolically overdetermines the various subjects (of the story) who 
are situated within the signifying chain (i.e., those who receive and are intended 
to receive the letter). But more importantly, “The Seminar on ‘The Purloined Let-
ter’” was one of Lacan’s first forays into the field of literary criticism, using fiction 
as a means of demonstrating his thesis that “the unconscious is structured like a 
language.”
Yet Lacan’s interpretation of “The Purloined Letter” was not without its crit-
ics, perhaps the most famous of whom was Jacques Derrida. In “The Purveyor of 
Truth” [1975] Derrida argued that Lacan had systematically misread Poe’s text and 
simultaneously accused him of “phallogocentrism.” According to Derrida, Lacan 
elevates the “lack” of the purloined letter’s “meaning” (its signification) into the 
meaning itself—into the letter’s truth. Lacan thereby privileges the “presence” of 
the phallus as that which anchors this lack vis-à-vis the “truth of castration,” over the 
play of signifiers. This is taken to be evident in Lacan’s aphoristic and seemingly te-
leological conclusion to his seminar: that “a letter always arrives at its destination.”2 
For Derrida, on the other hand, a letter can also not arrive at its destination. As he 
explains:
Its “materiality” and “topology” are due to its divisibility, its always pos-
sible partition. It can always be fragmented without return, and the 
system of the symbolic, of castration, of the signifier, of the truth, of 
the contrast, etc., always attempt to protect the letter from this frag-
mentation… not that the letter never arrives at its destination, but 
that it belongs to the structure of the letter to be capable, always, of 
2 Lacan, “The Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’” [1956], in Écrits, p. 30.
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not arriving.3
To paraphrase Barbara Johnson’s analysis, Derrida seems to pose himself against 
Lacan as the unsystemizable to the systemized, the accidental to the determined, 
and the “undecidable” to the “destination.”4 In other words, the opposition Lacan 
and Derrida in this instance functions as a restatement of kant’s third antinomy: 
either the subject is free from universal causality (Derrida), or universal causality 
wholly determines the subject (Lacan).
But, as Johnson is quick to point out, these oppositions are themselves mis-
readings of the very dynamic of what is at stake in the analysis. Along these lines, the 
more pertinent question to ask is: why might a letter, according to Lacan, always ar-
rive at its destination? Johnson explains that the logic is essentially one of Imaginary 
misrecognition, as later elaborated by Louis Althusser: the logic by means of which 
one misrecognizes oneself as the addressee of ideological interpellation. “[T]he 
letter is precisely that which subverts the polarity ‘subjective/objective,’ that which 
makes subjectivity into something whose position in a structure is situated by an 
object’s passage through it,” writes Johnson. “The letter’s destination is thus wher-
ever it is read: the place it assigns to its reader as his own partiality.”5 The logic of the 
“purloined letter” thus involves the short-circuit between ex post facto (determinative 
judgment) and ex ante facto (reflective judgment)6: if one views the process back-
3 Jacques Derrida, “The Purveyor of Truth,” in The Purloined Poe, p. 187 (my emphasis).
4 Barbara Johnson, “The Frame of Reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida,” in The Purloined Poe, p. 249.
5 Ibid., p. 248. 
6 Cf. karatani, Transcritique, pp. 187-188: “In Critique of Judgment kant distinguishes ‘determina-
tive judgments,’ which categorize concrete individual facts by established laws, from ‘reflective 
judgments,’ which pursue a new universality that subsumes the exceptional facts that are not yet 
categorized by established laws… Here it is possible to see the distinction between reflective and 
determinative as analogous to that between ex ante facto and ex post facto.” 
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wards from its contingent result, the fact that such a result took place must appear to 
the viewer as structurally necessary, as something which conceals some fateful mean-
ing.7 This logic is depicted in Lacan’s quaternary topology of the unconscious found 
in the so-called “L schema”:
I am, of course, aware of the importance of imaginary impregnations 
(Prägung) in the partializations of the symbolic alternative that give 
the signifying chain its appearance. nevertheless, I posit that it is the 
law specific to this chain which governs the psychoanalytic effects that 
are determinant for the subject.8
In other words, Lacan’s interpretation of “The Purloined Letter,” insofar as the sub-
ject is always already caught up in the process of misrecognition, places the empha-
sis on the signifying order as that of a closed synchronic structure, which functions 
as a blind “automatism” to which the subject is subjected. The diachronic order of 
signification is thus governed by the signifying automatism (the “purloined letter”), 
which is concealed by the Imaginary ego-to-ego relationship.9 Yet the notion of the 
subject depicted in the “L schema” is wholly unthinkable insofar as it is radically de-
subjectivized in the field of the other: the subject becomes totally subjected to the 
structure, alienated without a remainder. The Symbolic order is thereby reduced to 
a “structure without a subject.” Thus a letter always arrives at its destination, but at 
the cost of the radical de-subjectivization of the subject.
E XC o M M u n I C AT I o n
But Lacan did not hold this position to the end. Like Marx’s work, Lacan’s is 
7 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, pp. 2-3.
8 Lacan, “The Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’,” Écrits, p. 6.
9 Žižek, “Lacan: At What Point is he Hegelian?,” in Interrogating the Real (London: Continuum 
Books, 2005), p. 30.
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also characterized by numerous epistemological breaks—ruptures in his own theo-
retical edifice qua “the understanding”—brought about by incessant dislocation: 
in other words, a transposition from one “phase” to the next. Meaning, each new 
phase in Lacan’s work was, in a sense, the result of a simultaneous rupture in “sen-
sibility”—read as institutional crisis. If the Cartesian cogito is therefore understood 
as a purely abstract empty space—a void—but one that is nonetheless structurally 
necessary, then transposition ought to be understood as its concrete correlate. So, 
again, the year 1953 marked an important shift in Lacan’s thought, as that was the 
year in which he began his reinterpretation of the entire Freudian corpus through 
the lens of structuralism, but only by way of his break with the Société Psychanaly-
tique de Paris that very same year: a break which led to the subsequent formation 
of a new psychoanalytic institution—the Société Française de Psychanalyse—which 
Lacan joined soon thereafter. The same, it will be shown, also happens to hold true 
for the year 1963.
When Lacan and a number of his contemporaries, including Françoise Dolto, 
Serge Leclaire, and Daniel Lagache, decided in 1953 to abandon the S P P , which 
since 1926 had been the sole psychoanalytic institution in France, they wrongly as-
sumed that they would continue to remain members of the I PA . Instead, the S F P 
and its members were now no longer affiliated with the international association, a 
fact that had embarrassed the group’s leadership from its inception. And because 
they had never contemplated a break with the I PA —the center of Freudian legiti-
macy—they immediately entered into negotiations designed to bring them back 
in. But for this to occur the leadership needed to prove to an I PA  commission of 
inquiry that all of the training analysts (analysts who are allowed to train other ana-
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lysts) in the S F P  obeyed the standard rules involving session length.10
During this period it became increasingly evident that Lacan did not obey 
the technical rules that had been put in place by the I PA  since the 1920s and ‘30s. 
These rules stipulated that an analysis was supposed to last for at least four years and 
consist of four to five sessions a week, each session lasting at least fifty minutes.11 The 
rule governing session length was established in order to limit an analyst’s poten-
tially unlimited power: in that regard, it had helped to maintain the unity of the I PA 
during the era of the Controversial Discussions, in which Melanie klein and Anna 
Freud, as well as their respective followers, vied for control over the I PA  through 
the training of analysts. Thus, in a January 1954 report to the leaders of the S F P , the 
I PA ’s commission of inquiry concluded:
We were unanimously against the Lagache group forming an affiliated 
Society of the I PA  for the following reasons: a) in practical terms the 
Lagache group cannot give appropriate training to the large number 
of students they have registered, since Dr. Lagache and Dr. Lacan are 
the only training analysts; b) more importantly, the training methods 
of the Lagache group have deviated too far from the procedures of 
the component Societies and appear unacceptable.12
The commission of inquiry’s decision not to admit the S F P  into the I PA  centered 
largely on the issue of “deviated” training methods. This referred, for the most part, 
to Lacan (but also to Françoise Dolto) and his controversial use of variable-length 
sessions—often derogatively referred to as “short sessions” by his critics, although, 
as Adrian Johnston points out, this is misleading since Lacan would either shorten 
10 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 203.
11 Ibid., p. 202.
12 Alain de Mijolla, “Splits in the French Psychoanalytic Movement, Between 1953 and 1964,” in 
Within Time and Beyond Time: A Festschrift for Pearl King, eds. Riccardo Steiner and Jennifer Johns 
(London: karnac, 2001), p.12.
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or lengthen sessions, depending on the patient.13
Since the early 1950s, Lacan had defended his use of variable-length ses-
sions to the members of the S P P  on a number of separate occasions,14 but given the 
precarious situation faced by the S F P  and its members he could no longer justify 
his use of them as the practice stood firmly in the way of the S F P ’s incorporation 
into the I PA . Thus, Lacan never published the lectures delivered to the S P P  on the 
controversial subject, but he nevertheless went on conducting variable-length ses-
sions within the S F P , while at the same time publicly declaring that he had brought 
his practice into conformity with the I PA ’s rule governing session length. In other 
words, he lied.15
Lacan justified his variance of session length as a means of combating neuro-
sis. “neurotics, especially obsessionals, take advantage of fixed-length sessions; they 
pre-script monologues so as to ‘kill time’ and avoid the work of free association,” 
writes Johnston.
In this way, the rhythm of the sessions can be pressed into the ser-
vice of resistances. By truncating the sessions at his discretion (Lacan 
speaks of this as “punctuating” the sessions) Lacan not only thwarts 
the recitation of nonassociative “filler material”, but creates a sense of 
urgency for the analysand.16
The variable-length session thus interferes with the analysand’s attempt to maintain 
the self-consistency of their discourse by allowing the analyst, rather than the clock, 
to determine when the session ought to be brought to an end. So, although his mo-
13 Adrian Johnston, Time Driven: Metapsychology and the Splitting of the Drive (Evanston: northwestern 
university Press, 2005), p. 23.
14 Roudinesco cites the dates December 1951, June 1952, and February 1953 as those on which 
Lacan delivered lectures relating to variable-length sessions to the members of the SPP. Cf. Roudi-
nesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 203.
15 Ibid., p. 204.
16 Johnston, Time Driven, pp. 23-24.
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tives for this practice were tinged by suspicion—by shortening session length during 
training analysis, Lacan was able to produce more practicing analysts than any other 
training analyst in his school, thus securing a greater amount of financial wealth 
and institutional influence for himself17—Lacan nevertheless always grounded their 
use in his theories and, in doing so, decisively demonstrated the importance of 
temporality in the psychoanalytic clinic.18 Accordingly, in “Function and the Field 
of Speech” (September 1953), Lacan drew out the practical conclusions of his essay 
“Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty” (March 1945), arguing 
that “[s]etting in advance a time limit to an analysis, the first form of active inter-
vention, inaugurated (pro pudor!) by Freud himself…will invariably leave the subject 
alienated from his truth.”19
At the Copenhagen congress in July 1959, the Central Executive of the I PA 
ordered that another committee be setup to examine the French candidates. on 
May 15, 1961, a board of inquiry was dispatched to Paris to begin the investigation of 
the members of the S F P .20 Pierre Turquet, a personal friend of Lacan’s, was appoint-
ed by the I PA , along with a number of other analysts, to conduct the interviews, 
which included many of Lacan’s students and analysands. Turquet was encouraged 
by Serge Leclaire, the President of the S F P , to believe that Lacan would compro-
mise with the Executive Committee by agreeing to limit the number of analysands 
17 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 203.
18 The peculiar antinomy encountered by psychoanalysis in the realm of temporality has been be-
tween “the unconscious is eternal,” as formulated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and elsewhere, 
and “the unconscious is temporal,” as formulated in Freud’s theory of phantasy, particularly in 
the logic of Nachträglichkeit. Cf. Johnston, Time Driven, for an extensive and insightful analysis of 
this topic.
19 Lacan, “Function and Field,” Écrits, p. 256.
20 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 246.
59T R A N S C R I T I C A L  E N C O U N T E R S  I N  T H E  H U M A N  S C I E N C E S
he had taken on in order to facilitate the incorporation of the S F P  and its mem-
bers—including Lacan himself—into the I PA . But during the two long interviews 
that Turquet conducted—one in May and June of 1961 and the other in January 
1963—he realized that Lacan had not abandoned his former practices.21
As a result of Turquet’s first report, the Central Executive drew up a list of 
recommendations consisting of twenty points, which were promulgated at the Ed-
inburgh congress on August 2, 1961. of the twenty points, Article 13a stipulated 
that Lacan should not take on any more training analyses or controls.22 The other 
outcome of the Edinburgh congress was that the S F P  withdrew its direct request 
for affiliation with the I PA  and accepted the status of a Study group.23 The second 
report, however, led the Executive Committee to declare at the Stockholm congress 
in August 1963 that the one non-negotiable requirement for the S F P ’s membership 
was its voluntary acceptance of a ban on Lacan’s training activities.24 The I PA  fur-
ther stipulated that if Leclaire did not follow the measures set out by the so-called 
Stockholm “Directive,” then the I PA ’s continued sponsorship of the S F P  would be 
jeopardized. Thus, in a move which ironically followed the logic of Lacan’s “vel of 
alienation,” the choice offered by the Central Executive was either the retention of 
Lacan as a training analyst or the group’s incorporation into the I PA .25
on october 13, 1963 Lacan was officially removed from the S F P ’s list of 
training analysts. The motion, proposed by the Executive Committee, stipulated 
21 Ibid., p. 248.
22 Mijolla, Within Time and Beyond Time, p. 15.
23 Ibid., p. 14.
24 Johnston, Time Driven, p. 23.
25 “The International Psycho-Analytical Association Minute. The Study group S F P ,” October 40 
(Spring, 1987), pp. 79-80.
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that “[f]rom this day, Dr. Jacques Lacan will no longer appear on the list of ana-
lysts entitled to perform training analyses or supervision.”26 The motion was signed 
by S F P  members Juliette Favez-Boutonier, Daniel Lagache, Wladimir granoff and 
georges Favez, most of whom, along with a number of Lacan’s formal pupils (Jean 
Laplanche, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, etc.), went on to found the Association Psych-
analytique de France, which, along with the old S P P , was incorporated into the I PA 
after June 1964. Following the motion, the Board of the S F P —the majority of whom 
were in favor of retaining Lacan as a training analyst—decided on november 11, 
1963 not to apply this decision. As a result, on november 19 a new board was put in 
place and the members of the old board—including President Serge Leclaire and 
Vice-President Françoise Dolto—resigned immediately,27 solidifying around Lacan 
in opposition to the new leadership. By January 1965, the Study group S F P  was of-
ficially dissolved.
Several months later, on January 15, 1964, Lacan delivered his first lecture 
since the split with the S F P —now at the prestigious École normale Supérieure, 
rather than the Hôpital Sainte-Anne.28 In it, he described the ban on his teaching 
as an “excommunication,”29 comparing himself to Spinoza who, perhaps more than 
any philosopher, stands out as a singular cogito who refused to belong to any commu-
nity—“an existence externalized”—living in the interstice of nowhere, having been 
excommunicated not only from the Christian church but also from the Judaic syna-
gogue.30 But perhaps of greater interest is the fact that this lecture inaugurated the 
26 Mijolla, Within Time and Beyond Time, p. 16.
27 Ibid.
28 Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 2.
29 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
30 karatani, Transcritique, p. 96.
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beginning of Seminar XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, in which 
Lacan—in a manner homologous to his “return to Freud”—embarked on a “return 
to Descartes”—that is, a return to the cogito, the subject of doubt:
I will now dare to define the Cartesian I think as participating in its 
striving towards certainty, in a sort of abortion. The difference of sta-
tus given to the subject by the discovered dimension of the Freudian 
unconscious derives from desire, which must be situated at the level 
of the cogito. Whatever animates, that which any enunciation speaks 
of, belongs to desire.31
The cogito, in other words the Lacanian barred subject, far from being the subject 
of self-transparency and substantiality [sum], is simply another way of expressing 
transcendental subjectivity: it is the nothingness, the void, which is operative between 
various systems of thought. It can also be thought of as an excess, a remainder, or a 
“gap” (coterminous with the objet a—the object cause of desire) as Lacan refers to it, 
which is wholly irreducible to, and at the same time a product of, a given structure, 
in contrast to Lacan’s earlier formulation of structure found in the “L schema” and 
illustrated through his reading of Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.”
Institutional crisis as transposition can therefore be seen neither as external 
to Lacan’s theories, nor to his practice. Thus, on June 21, 1964—three days before 
the last lecture of Seminar XI—Lacan announced the founding of his own school 
of psychoanalysis: the École Freudienne de Paris.32
T H E  S T Ru C T u R A L I S T  C o n T R oV E R S Y
During the week of october 18-21, 1966, one of the most important develop-
31 Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 141.
32 Lacan, “Founding Act,” trans. Jeffrey Mehlman, October 40 (Spring, 1987), pp. 96-105. Worth 
noting is that the original name of the school was the École Française de Psychanalyse, but it was 
renamed the École Freudienne de Paris three months later.
62 P A R T  I I I
ments in post-war intellectual thought took place at the international symposium 
entitled “The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man,” convened in Bal-
timore under the auspices of the Johns Hopkins Humanities Center—newly insti-
tuted that year. The symposium brought together over one-hundred social theorists 
from across the Atlantic, including Roland Barthes, Jean Hyppolite, Jacques Der-
rida, and Jacques Lacan, and inaugurated a two-year program of seminars and col-
loquia “which sought to explore the impact of contemporary ‘structuralist’ thought 
on critical methods in humanistic and social studies.”33 More importantly, however, 
was that the symposium marked the first major eruption of an “anti-structuralist” 
tendency within the human sciences—what became known as the “structuralist 
controversy.” Reflecting back on the event in 1971, Richard Macksey, who oversaw 
much of the symposium and was himself a speaker there, writes:
Although the intellectual inheritance was clear, with its preoccupation 
with articulated sign-systems and the repudiation of the hermeneutic 
enterprises of the last century, evidence was already available in the 
Johns Hopkins symposium of the ensuing moment of theoretical de-
construction. The spaces had begun to open, not only between neigh-
boring camps but in the conceptual matrix of “structures” itself.34
Hence, following Macksey, if one can properly speak of “origins” as such after Der-
rida, then the Humanities Center symposium might very well be regarded as the 
origin of post-structuralism.
Historically, the exegesis of Lacanian theory has never been able to clear-
ly identify Lacan as either a structuralist or a post-structuralist. In fact, Lacan has 
always been looked upon with suspicion by both camps: to post-structuralists, he 
is viewed as still retaining at least a modicum of “phallogocentrism” and a theo-
33 Richard Macksey, “Preface,” in The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sci-
ences of Man, ed. Richard Macksey (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins university Press, 2007), p. xv.
34 Macksey, “The Space Between—1971,” in The Structuralist Controversy, p. ix.
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retical attachment to centrality and presence, citing in particular his references to 
castration, the phallus, and the point de capiton; to structuralists, Lacan—especially 
later Lacan of the gaze, jouissance, and Joycean language-games—is seen as having 
abandoned the scientific foundation that structuralism was premised on in favor of 
quasi-metaphysical gnomic propositions. To most others—and certainly there is a 
grain of truth to this commonplace—Lacan has been viewed as being in between, 
and influenced by, both movements, insofar as they constitute a binary opposition. 
In a strangely similar way, the same has historically been said of kant as well, being 
viewed as a philosopher “in between” two antithetical orientations (empiricism and 
rationalism) or, in less precise readings, simply an apologist for metaphysics (in the 
same way that Lacan has been described as an apologist for psychoanalysis, seen by 
its critics as no less metaphysical). However, in stark contrast to the imprecise logic 
of “in between” stands that of “parallax”: the critique of introspection by means of 
which one inscribes within self-scrutiny other’s viewpoints, thus revealing the antin-
omy of their opposition as an illusion, as well as the radical alterity (the thing-in-it-
self) upon which transcendental reflection is premised.35 This is the transcendental 
standpoint adopted by Lacan after 1963: the standpoint of “pronounced parallax” 
vis-à-vis structuralism and post-structuralism.
Structuralism began with Saussurean linguistics, in which a word is the prod-
uct of the “synthesis” between the signifier and the signified. But, as put forward 
earlier, this presupposes a certain kind of subjectivity which is capable of such a 
synthesis. It was Roman Jakobson who later elaborated this point by introducing 
into structural linguistics the element known as the “zero phoneme” in order to 
35 karatani, Transcritique, pp. 44-53.
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complete the phonemic system.36 For Jakobson, the zero phoneme is opposed to 
the absence of any phoneme whatsoever, while simultaneously devoid of any and all 
content.37 As kojin karatani argues, it is the void, the placeholder which, although 
nonexistent substantially, makes a system a system: in other words, the zero sign 
functions as a restatement of kantian transcendental subjectivity—the nothingness 
that constitutes the structure of the system.38 Thus, structuralism began with tran-
scendental subjectivity as its premise in the form of the zero sign.
Yet this did not prevent later generations of structuralist thinkers from aban-
doning the transcendental standpoint, believing that their elaboration of the struc-
ture (linguistic or otherwise) had successfully eliminated from modern thought 
the “problematic” of the subject, which consequently came to be reconceived as 
the substantial ego cogito of Western metaphysics.39 Structuralism therefore became 
an attractive intellectual orientation for those seeking to escape subjectivity and 
responsibility.40 It also led some structuralists, such as Louis Althusser, to return 
to Spinoza’s substance monism, thus resulting in structural determinism,41 e.g., Al-
thusser’s notion of “overdetermination.” The same may also be said of Lacan who, 
at least prior to 1963, held a similar view to Althusser’s apropos the relationship 
36 Ibid., p. 77.
37 Roman Jakobson and J. Lotz, “notes on the French Phonemic Pattern,” in Roman Jakobson, 
Selected Writings, vol. 1: Phonological Studies (Paris: gallimard, 1951), p. 872.
38 karatani, Transcritique, pp. 77-78.
39 Ibid., p. 78.
40 Ibid., p. 319 (cf. footnote 60).
41 Ibid., pp. 120-121. Additionally, one might point out the isomorphism between Spinoza’s and Al-
thusser’s “ethics of alienation”: for Althusser, there is no consciousness outside of ideology, just as 
for Spinoza there is no substance beyond the immanent one. To that extent, both reside purely 
within the alienated topos of the cogito, but never oscillate outside of it: hence their thought remains 
monist. Instead one must learn to “bracket” and “unbracket”: without this Will-to-Bracket there 
would be no transcendental subjectivity as such (the “bracketing” subject).
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between the structure and the subject, as seen in his application of the “L schema” 
to his reading of Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.”
Post-structuralism, it may be said, emerged then as a critique of the rigid 
determinism of the closed synchrony of the structure, the result of structuralist 
thinkers’ abandonment of structuralism’s (latent) transcendental premise. This is 
Jacques Derrida’s stance in “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Hu-
man Sciences,” first delivered at the Humanities Center conference in 1966. By 
putting into question the notional legitimacy of the structure’s “center,” Derrida 
effectively destabilizes—“deconstructs”—the apparent fixity of the elements within 
the structure. “[T]he center…closes off the freeplay it opens up and makes pos-
sible. Qua center, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, or 
terms is no longer possible,” Derrida wrote.
At the center, the permutation or the transformation of elements…
is forbidden…Thus it has always been thought that the center, which 
is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure 
which governs the structure, while escaping structurality. This is why 
classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is, 
paradoxically, within the structure and outside it. The center is at the 
center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the 
totality…the totality has its center elsewhere. The center is not the cen-
ter.42
In other words, for a structure to properly constitute itself as a stable, coherent, and 
closed system of differential elements, it must be a centered structure. But for Derrida 
this is a contradiction because the center, as the organizing principle of the struc-
ture, escapes structurality: it is simultaneously inside and outside, within and with-
out. The presence of center becomes the point of fixity and stability which anchors 
and limits the spontaneous freeplay of differential elements. Thus the history of the 
42 Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in The Structuralist 
Controversy, p. 248.
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concept of structure, with its “series of substitutions of center for center,” is simply 
an inheritance of Western metaphysics, the “determination of being as presence.”43
The ethics of deconstruction, or what karatani refers to as “the will-to-
deconstruct,”44 is based on the systematic unveiling of the absence of center, the 
absence of origin, and the absence of subject in order to suspend the metaphysics 
of presence and language as a determining system.45 Yet this also points to the limits 
of deconstruction: freeplay, as the disruption of presence,46 inevitably entails a cer-
tain kind of “loss of the world” in skeptical relativism, language games, empiricist 
historicism, and aesthetic affirmation of non-presence. Citing nietzsche, Derrida 
describes the deconstructionist attitude as “the joyous affirmation of the freeplay of 
the world and without truth, without origin, offered to an active interpretation…
This affirmation then determines the non-center otherwise than as a loss of the center.”47 Thus 
deconstruction inevitably turns to morality in the form of nietzschean affirmation 
as a means of overcoming the potentially melancholic loss of ground from which to 
base any truth.
This, however, is not Lacan’s position. In Seminar XI, The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan struggles to delineate the contours of the logic of 
alienation and that of separation, conceived as two fundamental and interconnect-
43 Ibid., p. 249. Two examples that come to mind are the presence of the voice, in contrast to the 
written word (cf. Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. gayatri C. Spivak [Baltimore: The Johns Hop-
kins university Press, 1998]), and the presence of self. A notable example in political economy, 
cited by karatani, is the presence of value qua quantity of labor, in contrast to money as the (al-
ways tainted) empirical medium of exchange in the circulation process.
44 Cf. karatani, Architecture as Metaphor: Language, Number, Money, trans. Sabu kohso (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1995).
45 Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play,” in The Structuralist Controversy, p. 258.
46 Ibid., p. 263.
47 Ibid., p. 264.
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ed functions which govern the relationship between the structure and the subject of 
the signifier. According to Lacan, while alienation describes the “fading,” the apha-
nisis, of the subject insofar as the subject disappears underneath the determinism of 
the structure, separation denotes the reverse process by which structural determina-
tion produces an excess or remainder in the form of the barred subject [S ̸] and its 
phantasmatic correlate, the lost object [a].
By separation, the subject finds, one might say, the weak point of the 
primal dyad of the signifying articulation, in so far as it is alienating in 
essence. It is in the interval between these two signifiers that resides 
the desire offered to the mapping of the subject in the experience of 
the discourse of the other…48
In other words, alienation in the other leads to separation from the other the 
moment when the lack in the other is fully recognized by the subject.49 Thus, just 
as Saussure rejected the internal consistency of language against von Humboldt’s 
romantic linguistics, while he simultaneously affirmed its enclosed structure against 
historical linguistics, Lacan rejected the notion of a totalizing structure without re-
mainder against the structuralists (the ex ante facto stance), while he affirmed its 
alienating totality against the post-structuralists (the ex post facto stance), for whom 
the Humean legacy of skepticism eventually became the dominant yet largely un-
spoken reference point.
To summarize in an alternative way what has thus been argued, Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, as a transcendental standpoint that only fully emerged out of the 
“pronounced parallax” between structuralism and post-structuralism, salvaged the 
48 Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 218.
49 Cf. Lacan, “of Structure as an Inmixing of an otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever,” 
in The Structuralist Controversy, p. 194: “[T]he relation between the barred subject with this object 
(a) is the structure which is always found in the phantasm which supports desire…” In other 
words, Lacan restates the above point, which is that fantasy functions to screen the abyss or lack 
in the other by means of “filling it out” with the objet a.
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radical, disavowed core of structuralism—premised, as it originally was, on the zero 
sign—as well as modern philosophy in general: the Cartesian cogito (or the transcen-
dental subject/Lacanian barred subject)—in other words, the subject of doubt, the 
subject for whom only doubt can be certain. The cogito, as the void which structures 
the system, makes it a system even, may be described as an inversion of the Derrid-
ean thesis regarding freeplay: rather than being the absence of subject, the tran-
scendental subject is the subject as absence. nevertheless, deconstruction is not wholly 
opposed to the transcendental standpoint: hence the Derridean “anti-notion” of 
différance as (spatial) difference and (temporal) deferment.  Différance, as neither a 
word nor a concept, can be read as an inscription of the alterity of the other (the 
Lacanian Real) as the minimal ontological difference in which transcendental sub-
jectivity resides.50
T H E  P o S T M o D E R n  A E S T H E T I C
In his lecture delivered at the John Hopkins Humanities Center symposium, 
Lacan curiously remarked that, “The best image to sum up the unconscious is Bal-
timore in the early morning,”51 which he prefaced with a brief description of his 
experience in the city earlier that week:
When I prepared this little talk for you, it was early in the morning. I 
could see Baltimore through the window and it was a very interesting 
moment because it was not quite daylight and a neon sign indicated 
to me every minute the change of time, and naturally there was heavy 
50 Cf. Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” in Writing and Difference (Chicago: The univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1978). Here Derrida first introduced the term différance in his response to 
Foucault, arguing that the cogito, rather than being in external opposition to madness, involves a 
passage through madness in the form of universal doubt. Derrida thereby maintained its transcen-
dental topos. 
51 Lacan, “of Structure as an Inmixing,” in The Structuralist Controversy, p. 189.
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traffic, and I remarked to myself that exactly all that I could see, ex-
cept for some trees in the distance, was the result of thoughts, actively 
thinking thoughts, where the function played by the subjects was not 
completely obvious. In any case the so-called Dasein, as a definition of 
the subject, was there in this rather intermittent or fading spectator.52
Some Lacanian historians, such as David Macey,53 have unconvincingly attempted to 
place the accent of this remark on the influence of surrealism on Lacan’s thought, 
citing the resemblance between his description of Baltimore and notable Surreal-
ist paintings, as well as Lacan’s well-known mingling with the Surrealist movement 
early in his career. And while it is true that the Surrealists profoundly influenced 
Lacan’s early work, as I have already pointed out, it is my contention, contra Macey, 
that the true accent of this quote ought to be placed, as strange as it may seem, on 
the city of Baltimore itself: that structures, just like the Cartesian cogito, far from 
being purely abstract systems of thought, can also be thought of as concrete—that 
is to say, perceived in the form of actual, material reality. Thus, against the May 1968 
protestors, one should defend Lacan’s infamous retort to Lucien goldmann: “If the 
events of May demonstrated anything at all, they showed that it was precisely that 
structures had taken to the streets!”54
Since 1972 the world has undergone a profound shift in political, cultural, 
and economic practices: the shift from “modernism” to “postmodernism.”55 While 
modernism has traditionally been understood as a rejection of the positivist strain 
52 Ibid.
53 Cf. Macey, “Baltimore in the Early Morning,” in Lacan in Contexts.
54 Françoise Dosse and D. glassman, History of Structuralism: The Sign Sets, 1967-Present (Minneapolis: 
university of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 122.
55 This was also the year in which support for the gold standard was officially dropped by the nixon 
administration. Interestingly, just as postmodernism began as a critique of foundationalism, this 
internal shift within capitalism brought about its own “crisis in foundationalism”: since 1972, the 
number of crises in the world-economy have rapidly escalated.
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of Enlightenment thought in favor of epistemological perspectivism as a means of 
revealing what it still took to be a unified notion of truth underlying appearance 
(the quintessential modernist gesture is one of unveiling the essence behind the 
multitude of appearances),56 postmodernism has been described by literary critic 
Terry Eagleton as the collapse of the “meta-narrative.”
Post-modernism signals the death of such “metanarratives” whose se-
cretly terroristic function was to ground and legitimate the illusion of 
a “universal” human history. We are now in the process of wakening 
from the nightmare of modernity, with its manipulative reason and 
fetish of the totality, into the laid-back pluralism and language games 
which has renounced the nostalgic urge to totalize and legitimate it-
self…Science and philosophy must jettison their grandiose metaphys-
ical claims and view themselves more modestly as just another set of 
narratives.57
The shift from modernism to postmodernism thus entails a shift from epistemology 
to ontology, from perspectivism to the “foregrounding of questions as to how radi-
cally different realities may coexist, collide, and interpenetrate.”58
Theorists such as Fredric Jameson and David Harvey have also argued that 
this change is inherently bound up with the new hegemonic forms in which we 
experience space and time. Harvey’s provocative thesis is that by analyzing the shift-
ing dimensions of space and time one can adduce the a priori grounds upon which 
the necessary relation between the rise of postmodern cultural forms and new flex-
ible modes of capital accumulation are founded. Thus for Harvey the “postmod-
ern condition” is understood as “space-time compression,” in which the collapse of 
temporality results in the reduction of experience to a series of pure and unrelated 
56 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cam-
bridge: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), p. 30.
57 Terry Eagleton, “Awakening from Modernity,” Times Literary Supplement (20 Feb. 1987), p. 194.
58 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 41.
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presents and that of space to what Jameson refers to as “contrived depthlessness,” 
the postmodern fascination with surfaces, mirrors, and appearances.59 According 
to Harvey, this leads to new techniques and organizational forms through which 
surplus-value is extracted.60
Citing transformations in architecture and urban design, Harvey points to 
the evolution of the city of Baltimore during the late-1960s and early-1970s as an 
exemplary case of this aesthetic, cultural, and economic transition. For Harvey it 
reflects the postmodern penchant for eclecticism and the usage of a-historical pas-
tiche apropos gentrification and urban renewal projects,61 as well as the postmodern 
appropriation of urban spectacle in the wake of the 1968 race riots (as in the case of 
the Baltimore City Fair, which marked the beginning of the institutionalized com-
mercialization of spectacle).62 In all of these cases, the differentiation in tastes and 
aesthetic preferences (the intermingling of local and cosmopolitan, classical and 
modern, etc.) has led to the production and consumption of what sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu called “symbolic capital,” the collection of luxury goods attesting to the 
taste and distinction of the owner.63 Thus the deconstruction of urban space and the 
collapse of historical narrativity apropos “space-time compression” has resulted in 
the decline of what Jameson refers to as “cognitive mapping,” our ability to properly 
narrativize and grasp the coordinates of social-symbolic reality, thus allowing for the 
proliferation of Capital as the ultimate deconstructive agent in the world.
given the emphasis on space and time throughout the aforementioned cri-
59 Ibid., p. 58.
60 Ibid., pp. 152-155.
61 Ibid., pp. 74-79.
62 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
63 Ibid., p. 77.
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tiques of postmodernity, it is surprising that little effort has been made to link to-
gether the transcritical dimensions of Marx and kant’s respective critiques, particu-
larly as a means of exploring the decline of symbolic efficacy under late capitalism. 
Harvey, for example, mentions kant only twice throughout The Condition of Postmo-
dernity, and both times only in relation to aesthetic judgment. Yet what is crucial in 
relation to “flexible accumulation” is not aesthetic judgment, but rather the tran-
scendental aesthetic: space and time as the a priori forms of sensible intuition.
Following karatani, one can read Marx’s notion of relative (as opposed to 
absolute) surplus-value in a similar manner: as the a priori ground of commodity 
exchange insofar as the production of surplus-value is necessarily conditioned by 
space and time. Thus, in the section of Capital, vol. 1 examining the production of 
relative surplus-value, Marx wrote:
By an increase in the productivity of labour, we mean an alteration in 
the labour process of such a kind as to shorten the labour-time socially 
necessarily for the production of a commodity…64
According to Marx, technological innovation—the constant “self-revolutionizing” 
of the means of production—is necessary in order for capitalists to extract greater 
quantities of surplus-value in the labor process by, on the one hand, maintaining 
the length of the working-day while simultaneously increasing output.65 The result-
ing increase in the productivity of labor therefore entails a temporal shift in the cir-
culation process, as seen in today’s hyper-kinetic production and consumption of 
64 karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes (new York: Penguin 
Books, 1990), p. 431.
65 Joseph Schumpeter maintained that capitalism was justified on the basis of its “creative destruc-
tion,” the process of transformation that accompanies radical innovation. Yet while it is true that 
capitalism engenders technological innovation and entrepreneurship, this comes about only as 
a means of achieving an end: surplus-value. In other words, Schumpeter’s position appears valid 
only by “bracketing” the question of ethics.
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information-commodity under late capitalism and its accompanying shift in empha-
sis away from industrial towards what Michael Hardt and Antonio negri refer to as 
“immaterial” labor.66
on the other hand, for Marx the creation of surplus-value through commod-
ity-exchange “begins where communities have their boundaries, at their points of 
contact with other communities, or with members of the latter.”67 In other words, 
the production of surplus-value relies on the (spatial) confrontation between dif-
ferent systems of value (hence Marx’s notion of “socially necessary labour time” as 
the basis of his value-theory). As David Harvey points out, “[f]lexible accumulation 
typically exploits a wide range of seemingly contingent geographical circumstanc-
es, and reconstitutes them as structured internal elements of its own encompass-
ing logic.”68 Thus, as Harvey and Jameson (if only latently) argue, the relationship 
between capitalism and its ideological supplements (e.g., postmodernism) can be 
grasped in relation to the fundamental passivity of sensibility (time and space) as 
the a priori grounds which structure empirical consciousness. This is the transcritical 
dimension of Marxist cultural criticism.
Lacan’s structuralist turn in psychoanalysis has been most famously 
encapsulated in his dictum, “The unconscious is structured like a language.” But 
what, precisely, is the subject of the unconscious? This is the question—the point of 
reference—that has been persistently posed throughout this chapter.
66 M. Hardt and A. negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 2001), p. 290: “Since the 
production of services results in no material and durable good, we define the labor involved in 
this production as immaterial labor — that is, labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a 
service, a cultural product, knowledge, or communication.”
67 Marx, p. 182.
68 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 294.
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Although Lacan’s transcendental schema of the Real, Symbolic, and the 
Imaginary came to be extracted as early as 1953 in the aftermath of the so-called 
“Controversial Discussions” between Melanie klein and Anna Freud, this discovery 
nevertheless resulted in of the elision of subjectivity. Thus in Lacan's “L schema” 
the subject came to be overdetermined by and alienated in the structure. As Lacan 
argued in Seminar II:
The coming into operation of the symbolic function in its most radi-
cal, absolute usage ends up abolishing the action of the individual 
so completely that by the same token it eliminates his tragic relation 
to the world…At the heart of the flow of events, the functioning of 
reason, the subject from the first move finds himself to be no more 
than a pawn, forced inside this system, and excluded from any truly 
dramatic, and consequently tragic, participation in the realization of 
truth.69
Thus Lacan conceived the subject as radically de-subjectivized, as a structure without 
a subject. But starting in 1963, the year in which he was “excommunicated” from the 
S F P  due to his controversial use of variable-length sessions, Lacan inaugurated the 
beginning of a “return to Descartes” with the introduction of the logic of separation 
into his work: a return to the cogito as the subject of doubt. In that sense, it was a re-
turn to the radical foundation upon which structuralism was premised (in the form 
of Jakobson’s “zero sign”), yet was quickly abandoned by later structuralist thinkers.
So what is the Cartesian cogito and how, precisely, does it relate to the field of 
the unconscious? In his Discourse on Method, René Descartes wrote:
For a long time I had noticed that, as for morals, it is sometimes neces-
sary to follow opinions that one knows to be quite uncertain, all the 
same as if they were indubitable, as has been said above; but, because 
I then desired to devote myself solely to the search for the truth, I 
thought that it was necessary that I were to do completely the con-
69 Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psycho-
analysis, 1954-1955, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (new York: W. W. norton, 
1988), p. 168.
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trary, and that I were to reject, as absolutely false, all that in which I 
could imagine the least doubt, in order to see whether there would 
remain, after that, something in my beliefs that were entirely indubi-
table…I resolved to feign that all the things that had ever entered my 
mind were no more true than the illusions of my dreams. But, imme-
diately afterward, I took note that, while I wanted thus to think that 
everything was false, it necessarily had to be that I, who was thinking 
this, were something. And noticing that this truth—I think, therefore 
I am—was so firm and so assured that all the most extravagant sup-
positions of the skeptics were not capable of shaking it, I judged that 
I could accept it, without scruple, as the first principle of the philoso-
phy that I was seeking.70
Here Descartes makes a distinction between “I think” and “I doubt,” yet, quickly 
confusing these terms, he concludes that “I think, therefore I am.” Due to this error 
Descartes deduced from the process of doubt the substantial ego [res cogitans] of 
Western metaphyscs, thereby eliding the doubting subject apropos its “withdrawal-
into-self”—the moment when all knowledge is bracketed. “Descartes apprehends 
his I think in the enunciation of the I doubt, not in its statement,” argues Lacan, 
“which still bears all of this knowledge to be put in doubt.”71 So while the doubt-
ing subject (the subject of enunciation) belongs to the field of unconscious desire 
(hence Descartes’s use of the word “desired”), the “I am” (the subject of the state-
ment) belongs to the Imaginary field of misrecognition. Lacan continues:
I dare to state as a truth that the Freudian field was possible only a 
certain time after the emergence of the Cartesian subject. In order to 
understand the Freudian concepts, one must set out on the basis that 
is the subject who is called—the subject of Cartesian origin. This basis 
gives its true function to what, in analysis, is called recollection or re-
membering. Recollection is not Platonic reminiscence—it is not the 
return of a form, an imprint, a eidos of beauty and good, a supreme 
truth, coming to us from beyond. It is something that comes to us 
from the structural necessities, something humble, born at the level 
of the lowest encounters and of all the talking crowd that precedes us, 
70 René Descartes, Discourse on Method [1637], trans. and ed. george Heffernan (South Bend: uni-
versity of notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 51; pt. 4, sec. 1.
71 Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 44.
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at the level of the structure of the signifier.72
For Lacan the subject of the unconscious is the cogito, the void that is produced 
by the doubting subject’s [dubito] enunciation of its own doubt. So although this 
barred/doubting subject proceeds from the signifier and is itself a signifier, it is 
irreducible to the totality of the structure. Thus Lacan, like kant, upholds that the 
subject is paradoxically both free and unfree: on the one hand the subject is com-
pletely overdetermined by the signifier, reduced to a pure function of the structure 
(alienation); on the other hand, this process of totalization fails on account of the 
fact that the other, like the subject, is not-all, incomplete, lacking (separation).
Additionally, the cogito is that which is located in between systems of thought: 
in the transcendental topos. This is the space in which Lacanian psychoanalysis, as 
I have argued, is situated, as is evident in the case of Lacan himself. His incessant 
transposition led him to encounter the problematic of “the other” throughout his 
career: in 1953, for example, he abandoned the S P P  and in doing so lost his I PA 
membership (thereby encountering the parallax between Melanie klein and Anna 
Freud); in 1963 he was forced out of the field of legitimate Freudianism and forced 
to found his own school, the École Freudienne de Paris (encountering the parallax 
between structuralism and post-structuralism). Finally, in 1969, the year he began 
his most thoroughgoing formalization of psychoanalytic theory, the administration 
of the École normale Supérieure attempted to have him fired for allegedly sowing 
rebellion amongst students.73 In that regard, the cogito as an abstract (theoretical) 
space cannot be separated from its concrete (practical) position: the two orienta-
tions, theoretical and practical, are intimately bound together.
72 Ibid., p. 47.
73 Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, p. 341.
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The entirety of this thesis could be summarized through the question: What 
is the common gesture inherent to both kantian transcendental philosophy (as well 
as post-kantian german Idealism) and Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalysis? The an-
swer is that, for both (as for any true philosophy), the common sense notion of 
“reality” is no longer taken at face value. kant, for example, points to the “synthetic 
unity of apperception” as the impossible (in the Lacanian sense of the Real) void 
that nonetheless structures the synthesis of our concepts (formal rules of the under-
standing) and intuitions (the content of our sense-perceptions). Lacan, meanwhile, 
demonstrates that many conditions must first be satisfied before we are able to ex-
perience something as “reality,” such as the construction of our self-identity through 
misrecognition, our proper installation into the Symbolic order vis-à-vis castration, 
etc. Behind this gesture, however, lies something more fundamental: the dimension 
of transcritique.
As kojin karatani points out, the crux of the transcendental position is not 
any sort of methodology, but an encounter with the problematic of alterity—of an 
otherness of the other. karatani argues that kant does not attempt to simply “rec-
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oncile” the differences encountered via parallax—this would be impossible. Along 
these lines, kant has been frequently misinterpreted as the philosopher who finally 
succeeded in harmoniously uniting empiricist skepticism with metaphysics (affirm-
ing, contra Lacan, that there really is a “sexual relationship”!). But evident through-
out all of kant’s critical work is that the split between our sensible and rational 
faculties inexorably leads towards an encounter with a radical otherness—what kant 
called the thing-in-itself—grasped by way of the fundamental passivity of sensibili-
ty.1 In that sense, kant went beyond both empiricism and rationalism through his 
inscription of “the other” within the transcendental architectonic. For Lacan, this 
(transcendental) “other” is termed “the Real,” the impossible kernel persisting with-
in the depths of fantasy. And as with kant, Lacanian barred subjectivity (the cogito) 
is isomorphic to this otherness—why?
What is really “other” about “the other” is not some mystical orientalism 
or transcendent (divine) other. Rather, it is the fact that, as Lacan paradoxically 
claimed, “there is no other of the other.” In other words, what we encounter in the 
transcendental field of “the other” is the fact that the other is lacking, but in order 
to cover up this lack we project onto it our innermost fantasies (e.g., conspiracy 
theories, sexual fantasies of a “primal scene,” etc.), which is why fantasy is in a way 
more real than so-called “reality” itself. Thus a confrontation with the lack in the 
other is nothing less than an encounter with oneself qua radical otherness. This is 
the transcendental standpoint towards subjectivity.
one of the goals, if not the goal, of analytic discourse (technique) is to force 
the analysand to confront this otherness (lack) persisting within the other. This 
1 karatani, Transcritique, p. 90.
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brings psychoanalysis in close proximity to the Marxist problematic of what györgy 
Lukács called “praxis”—the problematic synthesis between the theoretical and the 
practical. How does one unite the two? karatani’s suggestion is to read Marx into 
kant (to unearth the revolutionary core of kantian transcendental philosophy) and 
kant into Marx (to establish the ethical basis of Marxism). But one can also read 
kant into Lacan (as I have tried to do throughout this thesis), as well as Marx into 
Lacan: the Möbius strip of the transference is nothing less than the unity of theory 
and practice, which is why for Lacan the critique of analytic technique is of such 
great importance. Analytic technique is analytic praxis.
The question of analytic praxis brings us, finally, towards the focal point—the 
conclusion—of this thesis: what are the limits of psychoanalysis? After all, kant’s 
critique of pure reason was meant to establish the limits of reason by means of rea-
son’s self-scrutiny, just as Marx’s critique of political economy was meant to discover 
the limits of capital by means of capital’s inherent self-dynamic. For one, psycho-
analysis began as a discipline within the interstices—as a “Jewish science.”2 Analytic 
discourse therefore situated itself as “extimate”—at once intimate and external—in 
relation to the Law of the community: intimate because its examination placed itself 
within the locus of unconscious desire; external because it always remained “other” 
with respect to the Law. In Seminar XI, Lacan argued:
The analyst’s desire is not a pure desire. It is a desire to obtain abso-
lute difference, a desire which intervenes when, confronted with the 
[Master Signifier], the subject is, for the first time, in a position to 
subject himself to it. only there may the signification of a limitless 
love emerge, because it is outside the limits of the law, where alone it 
may live.3
2 It was also, like Marxism, born out of a certain kind of crisis: psychoanalysis was discovered 
through the case studies of female hysteria, the crisis of Victorian feminine subjectivity.
3 Lacan, Seminar XI, p. 276.
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Is there, then, a desire beyond the Law, beyond the limits of the Law? Apropos 
this question, Lacan’s answer (similar to Saint Paul’s in Romans 7:7) is that the Law 
is only sustained through the desire to transgress it. This, in other words, is the limit of 
the economy of desire: desire aims at the impossible kernel of the Real in order to 
remain within the limits of the Law, within the boundaries of “sin.” Thus after the 
analysand has “traversed the fantasy” by passing through the lack in the other, the 
product of the analyst’s discourse is not the analyst’s good, but that of a new Master 
Signifier: the subject’s Law outside the limits of hegemonic discourse no longer 
sustained through its own inherent transgression by revealing the impossibility of 
desire apropos the subject’s constitutive split (the death drive).4 To that extent, 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, as a transcendental critique, is always an ideology critique.
4 Cf. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, Limits of Love and 
Knowledge, 1972-1973, trans. Bruce Fink, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (new York: W. W. norton, 1998).
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